Behind the Locked Door of an American Grand Jury: Its History, Its Secrecy, and Its Process by Kadish, Mark
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 24 | Issue 1 Article 1
1996
Behind the Locked Door of an American Grand
Jury: Its History, Its Secrecy, and Its Process
Mark Kadish
1@1.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mark Kadish, Behind the Locked Door of an American Grand Jury: Its History, Its Secrecy, and Its Process, 24 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1 (1996) .
http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol24/iss1/1





BEHIND THE LOCKED DOOR OF AN AMERICAN GRAND JURY:  








































Recommended citation: Mark Kadish, Behind the Locked Door of an American Grand Jury: 
Its History, Its Secrecy, and Its Process, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1996).  
1BEHIND THE LOCKED DOOR OF AN AMERICAN




II. THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH AND COLONIAL GRAND JURIES........................... 5
A. The Grand Jury in England ...................................................................... 5
B. The Grand Jury in Colonial America ........................................................ 9
III. THE ROLE OF GRAND JURY SECRECY.................................................................. 12
A. The Beginnings of Grand Jury Secrecy...................................................... 12
B. Grand Jury Secrecy in Early American Jurisprudence............................. 16
IV. 1946 CODIFICATION OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE............ 23
V. INTERPRETATIONS OF THE 1946 SECRECY RULE................................................. 29
VI. PROCTER & GAMBLE: A MISSED OPPORTUNITY ................................................ 34
VII. EMERGING CONCERNS OVER ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY ACCESS TO GRAND
JURY MATERIALS ............................................................................................... 41
VIII. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION.................................................................................... 45
A. The 1977 Amendment................................................................................. 45
B. 1981 Amendment Proposal......................................................................... 52
IX. SELLS AND BAGGOT ........................................................................................... 53
A. United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc..................................................... 54
B. United States v. Baggot ............................................................................. 60
X. 1985 AMENDMENT TO RULE 6(E) ........................................................................ 62
XI. UNITED STATES V. JOHN DOE, INC................................................................... 65
XII. GRAND JURY SECRECY AFTER DOE. ................................................................... 70
XIII. THE MARYLAND & VIRGINIA MILK PRODUCERS ASS’N SOLUTION .................... 73
XIV. CONCLUSION...................................................................................................... 74
I.   INTRODUCTION
The purpose of our Constitution is to create a government that
protects people from each other.1 The purpose of our Bill of Rights
is to protect each of us from our government.2 Fundamental in
any ordered system of government is an understanding that the
people have the right to be free from crime. But, even more im-
portant, the people have a right to be free from a government
that takes life, liberty, and property without due process of law.
                                                                                                             
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgia State University. B.A., Lafayette College,
1964; LL.B., New York University, 1967. I am indebted to my colleagues Professor Kath-
ryn Urbonya and Associate Professor Ellen Podgor for their insightful comments. A special
thanks goes to my research assistants Rhonda Byers and Paul Vignos for their commit-
ment to this project.
1. See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1651)
(asserting that freedom requires relinquishment of power to avoid pitting each person
against the other).
2. See e.g., Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 870-73 (1960);
Loren A. Smith, Introduction To Symposium On Regulatory Takings, 46 S.C. L. REV. 525,
526 (1995) (stating that the very purpose of the Bill of Rights is to protect citizens from
government).
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This Article focuses on whether the development, interpreta-
tion, and administration of federal grand jury secrecy provisions
has adhered to due process strictures. It suggests that due proc-
ess concerns have yielded to goals of government efficiency in
federal law enforcement. The Article offers a solution that pro-
tects historical grand jury secrecy while encompassing the con-
cerns of efficient and effective federal law enforcement. This eas-
ily executed solution has eluded the U.S. Supreme Court, Con-
gress, and commentators over the last fifty years. Only one U.S.
Court of Appeals decision, Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers
Ass’n v. United States ,3 has recognized the simplicity and fairness
of this solution to both the people and the government. The Su-
preme Court, however, has never even discussed this critical
1957 D.C. Circuit decision, propounded by the Secretary to the
1946 Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure,4 in its later, seminal decisions on grand jury secrecy.5
This simple, unnoticed, one-page panel order balanced the inter-
est of the government in efficient and cost-effective civil regula-
tory investigations against the interests in grand jury secrecy by
allowing disclosure of grand jury materials for subsequent civil
proceedings only to the extent that they would have been discov-
erable by government civil investigative devices. To implement
this solution, the Supreme Court and Congress should revisit the
federal grand jury secrecy rule.
Part II of this Article is an historical analysis. It examines the
grand jury system as it originated in England and developed in
colonial America. Part II also focuses on the evolution of the
grand jury’s function from a powerful tool for the monarch to a
shield protecting citizens from the king’s abuses.
Part III addresses the critical role secrecy has played in the
evolution of the grand jury system in America. It examines se-
crecy interests in the context of the purpose for disclosure, sug-
gesting that when disclosure is sought by the government for use
in civil regulatory actions, the courts must consider the defen-
dant’s interest in a fair civil trial process.
Part IV focuses on the 1946 codification of the common law
rule of grand jury secrecy into Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
                                                                                                             
3. 250 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
4. See Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass’n v. United States, 151 F. Supp.
438, 440 (D.D.C. 1956). U.S. District Judge Alexander Holtzoff, the author of the lower
court opinion that proposed the approach, was also Secretary to the 1946 Advisory Com-
mittee on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
5. See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958); United States v.
Baggot, 463 U.S. 476 (1983); United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418 (1983).
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dure 6(e).6 A detailed analysis of the rule’s drafting history re-
veals congressional concerns over illegal or unauthorized use of
grand jury information in government civil proceedings and a
legislative intent that grand jury materials only be disclosed to
government attorneys handling criminal prosecutions.
Part V discusses the different approaches taken by the lower
courts in permitting disclosure of grand jury materials in gov-
ernment civil litigation after the codification of Rule 6(e). The
most significant of these is the fair process approach taken by
Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass’n . This rather simple,
common-sense concept forms the bedrock for the thesis of this
article.
Part VI discusses the Supreme Court’s decision in United
States v. Procter & Gamble Co. ,7 the Court’s first opportunity to
address grand jury secrecy in terms of civil disclosure. Analysis of
Procter & Gamble  exposes the problems inherent in parallel civil
and criminal investigations. Part VI also examines the nine-year
discovery battle between the United States and Procter & Gam-
ble, revealing that disclosure of grand jury material to govern-
ment civil attorneys provides an incentive for abuse of the grand
jury system and can create a substantial imbalance in civil dis-
covery.
Part VII discusses the emerging concern over civil use of grand
jury materials in the context of federal administrative agency ac-
cess to such information. Enabling legislation that created agen-
cies with substantial civil and criminal enforcement powers pre-
sented significant grand jury secrecy issues parallel to those ex-
amined in Procter & Gamble . Questions also arose concerning the
extent to which agency personnel could gain access to grand jury
materials by assisting the prosecutor with the grand jury investi-
gation. Part VII also traces case law that eventually prompted
legislative action amending Rule 6(e).
Part VIII analyzes the legislative history of the 1977 amend-
ment to Rule 6(e),8 which demonstrates congressional efforts to
limit civil regulatory use of grand jury material,9 and the 1981
proposed amendment that clarified Congress’s intent.10 The 1977
amendment expanded Rule 6(e) disclosure exceptions and
                                                                                                             
6. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e); see also infra text accompanying note 160-62.
7. 356 U.S. 677 (1958).
8. Act of July 30, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-78, 91 Stat. 319 (1977) (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. app. (1994)).
9. See infra note 300.
10. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to The Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 91 F.R.D. 289, 301-05 (1981).
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authorized disclosure of grand jury materials to government per-
sonnel to assist prosecutors in their duties.11 The 1981 proposed
amendment, ultimately tabled in committee, would have ex-
pressly limited the term “attorney for the government” to permit
automatic disclosure of grand jury materials only to government
prosecutors conducting criminal investigations.12
Part IX reviews United States v. Sells Engineering Corp. 13 and
United States v. Baggot ,14 the seminal Supreme Court decisions
that interpreted the 1977 amendment to Rule 6(e). Sells and
Baggot clearly held that government civil attorneys are not per-
mitted automatic access to grand jury materials to aid in civil
proceedings. Part IX also focuses on the Court’s concerns over
grand jury abuse and the disparity in civil discovery when gov-
ernment attorneys use grand jury materials in subsequent civil
proceedings.15 Although these cases provided a prophylactic
bright-line rule that protects the individual, they failed to ade-
quately balance that interest against the cost to the government
of duplicate investigations. As in Procter & Gamble , the Supreme
Court failed to consider the fair approach taken in Maryland &
Virginia Milk Producers Ass’n .
Parts X, XI, and XII trace the evolution of the grand jury se-
crecy rule since Sells and Baggot, pointing out the ever-
competing interests in efficient civil investigations and the need
for grand jury secrecy. These sections reveal that grand jury se-
crecy is being eroded to avoid the extensive costs and delays that
occur when governmental agencies must duplicate grand jury in-
vestigations for subsequent civil proceedings.
This Article is also a response to Professor Graham Hughes’
recent Vanderbilt Law Review article,16 which proposed coordi-
nating federal compulsory process and modifying the federal
grand jury secrecy rule.17 Professor Hughes thoroughly explored
the difficulties and inefficiencies inherent in parallel criminal and
civil investigations in light of modern practice and suggested that
separation of the two processes is artificial.18 Professor Hughes
                                                                                                             
11. S. REP NO. 354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N.
527, 531.
12. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments, 91 F.R.D. at 302.
13. 463 U.S. 418 (1983).
14. 463 U.S. 476 (1983).
15. See Sells, 463 U.S. at 434.
16. Graham Hughes, Administrative Subpoenas and the Grand Jury: Converging
Streams of Criminal and Civil Compulsory Process, 47 VAND. L. REV. 573 (1994).
17. See generally id.
18. Id. at 610-11.
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recommended eliminating the requirement that disclosure of
grand jury materials to the government be made only
“preliminarily to a ‘judicial proceeding,’ ” thus allowing disclosure
for civil regulatory investigations.19 He also proposed lowering the
standard required for federal civil attorneys to gain access to
grand jury materials from a “particularized need” to a
“substantial need.”20 While this Article acknowledges the difficul-
ties surrounding parallel investigations, and agrees modification
of Rule 6(e) is necessary, it rejects Professor Hughes’ solution as
not affording citizens the requisite fair process.
Finally, part XIV concludes that the all-or-nothing approach
taken by the courts, Congress, and commentators can be avoided
by adopting the solution proposed in Maryland & Virginia Milk
Producers Ass’n , which equitably balanced the interest in cost-
effective civil regulatory investigations against the interest in
protecting the secrecy of the grand jury process, thus providing
fair process to the individual.
II.   THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH AND COLONIAL GRAND
JURIES
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that “our constitutional
grand jury was intended to operate substantially like its English
progenitor.”21 An historical analysis of the grand jury thus helps
to assess the role secrecy plays in the modern American grand
jury system. This analysis reveals that grand jury secrecy serves
two competing functions, which courts should enforce in a man-
ner that equitably balances both roles.
A.   The Grand Jury in England
The earliest progenitor of our grand jury had two main func-
tions: to accuse criminals22 and to extend the central government
throughout England.23 In twelfth-century England, criminal
                                                                                                             
19. Id. at 657-63.
20. Id.
21. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956).
22. SARA SUN BEALE & WILLIAM C. BRYSON, GRAND JURY L. & PRAC. § 1:02 (1986):
Although the English grand jury was praised in later years as an important
safeguard of individual liberty, its original purposes were to increase the num-
ber of criminal prosecutions, to enhance the king’s authority, and indirectly to
raise revenue for the Crown, which received the property forfeited by persons
convicted of crimes.
23. See Helene E. Schwartz, Demythologizing the Historic Role of the Grand Jury, 10
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 701, 703 (1972) (“[T]he ancestor of our modern grand jury is generally
conceded to be the body which was formally made part of the English judicial machinery
6 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:1
charges were prosecuted essentially by individuals,24 with the
king acting as “a super-privileged individual.”25 The king was
thus personally involved in the medieval criminal justice system.
With the promulgation of the Assize of Clarendon in 1166,26 King
Henry II established a system of local informers27 (twelve men
from every hundred28 or four men from every vill29) to tell him
who was suspected of “murder, robbery, larceny, or harbouring
criminals.”30 The king’s system, which superseded baronial and
ecclesiastical jurisdiction,31 made the king the beneficiary of the
fines and forfeitures that attended the accusations.32 The system
required the twelve men to report all suspects33 and fined them if
they failed to indict any suspect34 or even if they failed to indict
an acceptable number of suspects.35 The twelve men secretly
named violators to give the sheriff a chance to seize those who
were indicted.36 Those whom the twelve men accused were tried
                                                                                                             
during the reign of Henry II, as a direct result of that monarch’s attempt to assert his
dominance over the ecclesiastical and feudal realms.”).
24. Susan M. Schiappa, Preserving the Autonomy and Function of the Grand Jury:
United States v. Williams, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 311, 324 (1993).
25. Julius Goebel, Jr., Constitutional History and Constitutional Law, 38 COLUM. L.
REV. 555, 560 (1938).
26. Helene Schwartz identifies the Constitutions of Clarendon, announced in 1164, as
an earlier documented forerunner. See Schwartz, supra note 23, at 705-07.
27. Presenting evidence against wrongdoers seems to have been recognized before the
twelfth century. The Saxon method of bringing offenders to justice included a semi-annual
tour by the sheriff through all the towns to punish offenders. GEORGE J. EDWARDS, JR.,
THE GRAND JURY 5 (1906). In the interim, all citizens were made sureties for the good be-
havior of each other through the system of frank-pledge. Id. When the sheriff arrived, the
people were required to tell him whom to punish. Id. at 5, 8. The Norman kings of England
required answers from representatives of local government and also enforced communal
responsibility for criminal acts. United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 288 (N.D. Cal.
1952)
28. A hundred is a subdivision of the shire. BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 22, § 1:02.
Each hundred had a court; and, in 1234, by ordinance of Henry II, these courts met every
three weeks, and were visited by the king’s sheriff twice a year to enforce the frank-pledge
system and obtain accusations. SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC MAITLAND, THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 557-59 (2d ed. 1952).
29. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 28, at 560. The vill of the thirteenth century
was the civil parish of the nineteenth century, which was originally a purely ecclesiastical
district. Id.
30. Id. at 152. Ten years later, forgery and arson were added to this list of crimes. Id.
31. Schiappa, supra note 24, at 326 nn.74 & 76; Schwartz, supra note 23, at 708-09;
EDWARDS, supra note 27, at 7.
32. Schiappa, supra note 24, at 326 n.76; Schwartz, supra note 23 at 709.
33. BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 22, § 1:02.
34. Although fining of jurors ended in 1667, Schwartz, supra note 23, at 709 n.41.,
the practice continued for at least another 100 years in the State of Connecticut, EDWARDS,
supra note 27, at 12 n.62. See also BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 22, § 1:02 n.29 (noting
that earliest imposition of fines may have been in 1194).
35. Schiappa, supra note 24, at 326 n.76; Schwartz, supra note 23, at 709.
36. EDWARDS, supra note 27, at 20-21. The initial secrecy provisions were thus not for
the protection of any interest other than that of bringing the accused to trial.
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by ordeal, which forced the suspects to prove their innocence by
overcoming the laws of nature.37 Since the “trial” was punishing,
if not actually fatal, the accusation by the king’s twelve men was
the beginning and end of fundamental fairness in the twelfth-
century.
The twelve men were also empowered to conduct other busi-
ness of the monarchy.38 For example, in 1188, the twelve men be-
came tax assessors for the Saladin Tithe.39 Shortly after the reign
of Henry III ended in 1272, the twelve men were looking into the
condition and maintenance of public works, including highways,
bridges, and jails.40 During this same time period, the twelve men
were sworn to secrecy.41 Nevertheless, the twelve men turned the
information gathered from their inquiries over to itinerant jus-
tices sent by the monarchy.42 These justices had the power to in-
terrogate each of the twelve men to determine how they arrived
at their findings.43
Significantly, in 1215, King John was forced by his barons to
sign the Magna Carta, which delineated individual protections of
life, liberty, and property by order of law.44 This revered docu-
ment did not specifically address the issue of grand jury secrecy.
It did, however, introduce the concept of due process against
which any procedural practice must be measured.45
                                                                                                             
37. Schwartz, supra note 23, at 708. For example, the ordeal of the boiling water re-
quired the accused to grab a rock out of a cauldron of boiling water without getting
burned; or if burned, by healing within three days. Another ordeal proved innocence if the
accused sank in a pool of water with both hands tied together under the knees; but if the
accused sank, the accused usually drowned to death. See generally THEODORE F.T.
PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 113-15 (5th ed. 1956); H. LEA,
SUPERSTITION AND FORCE, 222-61 (2d ed. 1958); ROBERT BARTLETT, TRIAL BY FIRE AND
WATER: THE MEDIEVAL JUDICIAL ORDEAL (1986).
38. Schwartz, supra note 23, at 709.
39. Id. The Saladin Tithe was a levy for financing the Third Crusade against the
Moslem general Saladin. The tithe fell particularly heavily upon the Jewish community,
who were forced to contribute 60,000 pounds (which represented one quarter of all the
property they owned in England and which was held, ultimately, on the king’s behalf). See
Judith A. Shapiro, Note, The Shetar’s Effect on English Law—A Law of the Jews Becomes
the Law of the Land, 71 GEO. L.J. 1179, 1188 n.82 (1983).
40. EDWARDS, supra note 27, at 25.
41. The oath stated “that they will lawful presentment make of such chapters as shall
be delivered to them in writing and in this they will not fail for any love, hatred, fear, re-
ward, or promise, and that they will conceal the secrets, so help them God and the Saints.”
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
42. Id. at 24-25.
43. Id. at 27.
44. “The ancestry of the due process clause is universally traced to chapter 39 of the
Magna Carta . . . .” Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 WIS. L. REV.
941, 948. Chapters 39 and 40 were combined and renumbered as chapter 29 in the Magna
Carta published in 1225. Id. at 949 n.30.
45. Id. at 951.
8 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:1
 During the reign of Edward III (1312-1377), the twelve men
were superseded by twenty-four knights chosen by the county
sheriff, who had authority for beginning a prosecution.46 The
knights were called “le grande inquest.”47 Their jurisdiction over
the indictment process had no statutory authorization, but rather
developed as part of the common law.48 Meanwhile, the twelve
men, having lost their original inquisitorial jurisdiction, became
known as the petit jury,49 which had responsibility for rendering
a verdict of innocent or guilty in capital crimes. Therefore, by the
fourteenth century, the developing criminal common law included
two salient procedural devices: an indicting grand jury and an
adjudicating petit jury.
In 1642, the English legal philosopher Edward Coke50 inter-
preted the Magna Carta provision “Nullus liber homo capiatur,
aut imprisonetur” as preserving life, liberty, and property subject
to the “law of the land.”51 William Blackstone interpreted Coke’s
“law of the land” to require a two-tier process before a person
could be deprived of (at least) life.52 The vote by the grand jury in
the first proceeding determined whether there was probable
cause to believe that the individual accused was guilty of the
crime charged; the vote by the petit jury in the second proceeding
determined whether there was enough evidence to convict.53 The
petit jury provided little protection to the innocent accused, how-
ever, because the king often fined or imprisoned jurors who re-
                                                                                                             




50. Edward Coke, author of the Institutes, was widely recognized as an authority on
law by both the English and Americans during the eighteenth century. See, e.g., Chase J.
Sanders, Ninth Life: An Interpretive Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 69 IND. L.J. 759, 800
(1994) (observing that Coke, along with William Blackstone and John Locke, was called a
legal philosopher).
51. 2 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND *46.
52. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *132-39. The Supreme Court later stated
that Coke’s interpretation of the Magna Carta was misunderstood:
It was not intended to assert that an indictment or presentment of a grand jury
was essential to the idea of due process of law in the prosecution and punish-
ment of crimes, but was only mentioned as an example and illustration of due
process of law as it actually existed in cases in which it was customarily used.
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 552 (1984). A process that afforded additional due
process safeguards beyond those provided by the grand jury, such as the probable cause
hearing, in which the defendant had an opportunity to present exculpatory evidence and
cross examine prosecution witnesses, was considered a constitutionally acceptable method
instigating a prosecution. See id.
53. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 52, at *306. The two-trial procedure was in place 40
years before Bracton published his legal treatise in the period 1220-1257. See EDWARDS,
supra note 27, at 25.
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fused to convict.54 Reacting to this monarchical abuse, the grand
juries began to shift their focus away from mere accusation to
considerations of fairness for the individual accused.55
Two celebrated cases became the catalyst for writers to define
the rights and powers of English grand juries.56 When pro-
Protestant grand juries in London refused to indict Catholic King
Charles II’s enemies, Lord Shaftesbury and Stephen Colledge,57
the grand jury became an institution “capable of being a real
safeguard for the liberties of the subject.”58 For the first time,
grand juries were positively identified as something other than
enforcement agencies of central government; they also existed for
the protection of the accused.59
B.   The Grand Jury in Colonial America
The American colonies were slow to import the grand jury
from England. It was not until 1635 that the first regular grand
jury was established.60 Before grand juries, the colonies used
                                                                                                             
54. See Lisa H. Wallach, Note, Prosecutorial Misconduct in the Grand Jury: Dismissal
of Indictments Pursuant to the Federal Supervisory Power, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 129, 131
n.15 (1987).
55. Id.
56. The writings of Sir John Hawles (The Englishman’s Rights (1680)), John Somers
(Lord Chancellor of England, The Security of Inglish-Mens Lives, or the Trust, Power, and
Duty of the Grand Jurys of England (1682)), and Henry Care (English Liberties or Free
Born Subject’s Inheritance (1698)) were printed several times in the colonies. See RICHARD
D. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE’S PANEL: THE GRAND JURY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1634-1941 21
(1963): “When the American colonists clashed with absentee trustees or with representa-
tives of royal authority, they too began to see the grand jury in a different light. Instead of
a routine, burdensome institution it became the bulwark of their rights and privileges.” Id.
For a similar conclusion, see BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 22, § 1:02.
57. For a detailed narrative of the Shaftesbury and Colledge cases, see Schwartz, su-
pra note 23, at 710-20.
58. LESTER B. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 141 (1947)
(quoting Letter from Professor William S. Holdsworth (July 13, 1933) (defending English
grand jury shortly before it was drastically curtailed and finally abandoned in England)).
59. JOHN SOMERS, THE SECURITY OF INGLISH-MENS LIVES, OR THE TRUST, POWER, AND
DUTY OF THE GRAND JURYS OF ENGLAND 12 (London, Benjamin Alsop 1682):
It was absolutely necessary for the support of the Government, and the safety
of every Mans life and interest, that some should be trusted to inquire after all
such as by Treasons, Felonies, or lesser Crimes, disturbed the peace, that they
might be prosecuted, and brought to condign punishment; and it was no less
needful for every mans quiet and safety, that the truth of such inquisitions
should be put into the hands of Persons of understanding, and integrity, indif-
ferent, and impartial, that might suffer no man to be falsely accused, or de-
famed, nor the lives of any to be put in jeopardy, by the malicious conspiracies
of great or small, or the Perjuries of any profligate wretches: For these neces-
sary honest ends was the institution of Grand Juries.
See also Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956) (“The basic purpose of the
English grand jury was to provide a fair method for instituting criminal proceedings
against persons believed to have committed crimes.”).
60. YOUNGER, supra note 56, at 6.
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“assistants,” whom the English monarchy authorized to make the
laws, accuse suspects, and sit in judgment of criminals.61 Having
no checks or balances, the assistants were too powerful and abu-
sive. In response to this abuse, one of the first American grand
juries charged several of the assistants themselves with viola-
tions of the criminal law.62 Thus, decidedly unlike its English
progenitor, the American grand jury originally began, not as an
arm of the executive, but as a defense against monarchy. It es-
tablished a screen between accusations and convictions and initi-
ated prosecutions of corrupt agents of the government. Therefore,
the English progenitor upon which the American grand jury was
modeled was the more enlightened protective grand jury of the
1600s.
In the early American experience, the grand jury also became
more a part of local government than it had apparently been in
England.63 For example, in the early development of the Massa-
chusetts grand jury, town officials were presented64 for neglecting
to repair the stocks65 and for failing to repair the highway.66 The
Virginia grand juries became part of the county court system in
1662 and met twice a year to levy taxes, oversee spending, su-
pervise public works, appoint local officials, and consider criminal
accusations.67 By the middle of the 1700s, the Connecticut grand
jury was helping to levy taxes and conduct other local govern-
ment work while a public prosecutor took primary responsibility
for investigating crime.68 In the Carolinas,69 Georgia,70 Mary-
land,71 New Jersey,72 and Pennsylvania,73 the pattern was similar:
in addition to screening criminal accusations, American grand
                                                                                                             
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. “In the absence of other governmental bodies, the [colonial] grand juries took over
a wide range of administrative tasks and operated with a substantial degree of independ-
ence.” BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 22, § 1:03.
64. Presentment is “an accusation, initiated by the grand jury itself, and in effect an
instruction that an indictment be drawn.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1184 (6th ed. 1990).
For a cogent argument of both the present and historical merits of grand jury presentment
powers and a comment on the Rocky Flats grand jury investigation that terminated before
indictment, see Renee B. Lettow, Note, Reviving Federal Grand Jury Presentments, 103
YALE L.J. 1333 (1994).
65. YOUNGER, supra note 56, at 7.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 10-11.
68. Id. at 9.
69. Id. at 16.
70. Id. at 16-17.
71. Id. at 12.
72. Id. at 13.
73. Id. at 15-16.
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juries took an active role in local government and had sufficient
independence to announce dissatisfaction with government.74
As the colonies moved closer to revolution, the grand jury took
on a third role: outright resistance to the monarchy.75 Three suc-
cessive grand juries refused to indict John Peter Zenger, whose
newspaper criticized the withdrawal of jury trials and the royal
control of New York.76 While the King was withdrawing the right
to trial by jury77 and attempting to initiate prosecutions by infor-
mations,78 colonial grand juries responded by making “stinging
denunciations of Great Britain and stirring defenses of their
rights as Englishmen.”79 Newspapers often republished these
criticisms.80
After the Revolution, the centralized government was created
without a federal grand jury. The Constitution created three
separate branches of government and delineated the powers of
each, but did not establish grand juries.81 Nor were grand juries
established in the Judiciary Act of 1789,82 which set up the fed-
                                                                                                             
74. For a more detailed discussion of the early grand juries in America, see id. at 6-
26.
75. Id. at 27.
76. Zenger was then charged by information, imprisoned for eight months under an
impossibly high bond, and tried for seditious libel under a law which held that the greater
the truth the greater the libel. Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of
the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 871-73 (1994).
77. Richard S. Arnold, Trial by Jury: The Constitutional Right to a Jury of Twelve in
Civil Trials, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 14 (1993):
[The king] issued mandates to colonial governors, who then attempted to cir-
cumvent the right to trial by jury by expanding admiralty jurisdiction . . . [in
which cases were tried by judges who were] appointed and removed by royal
governors, who insisted on verdicts they favored in order for the judge to re-
main on the bench.
78. YOUNGER, supra note 56, at 27.
79. Id. at 34.
80. Id.
81. That omission prompted at least Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New York
to call for an amendment to the Constitution preventing federal prosecutions except by
indictment before a grand jury. Schiappa, supra note 24, at 329-30; Lettow, supra note 64,
at 1338 n.20 (citing 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 677, 761, 855
(Bernard Schwartz ed., 1971)); YOUNGER, supra note 56, at 45-46. The Fifth Amendment,
ratified in 1791—only two years after the Constitution—closely tracks an amendment
drafted by John Hancock and forwarded to Congress by the Massachusetts convention.
BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 22, § 1:04. The amendment drafted by Hancock provided
“[t]hat no person shall be tried for any Crime by which he may incur an infamous punish-
ment or loss of life until he be first indicted by a Grand Jury, except in such cases as may
arise in the Government & regulation of Land & Naval forces.” Id. The Fifth Amendment
provides: “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land
or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or pubic danger.”
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
82. 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
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eral court system.83 However, after passing the Judiciary Act,
Congress approved twelve constitutional amendments84 for ratifi-
cation by the states. In 1791, the Fifth Amendment was adopted
as part of the Bill of Rights, with its Grand Jury Clause insuring
that “[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or other-
wise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury . . . .”85 The Grand Jury Clause protected the people
against arbitrary and overzealous government by protecting
“against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution.”86 Secrecy
in grand jury proceedings played a role in that protection.
III.   THE ROLE OF GRAND JURY SECRECY
A.   The Beginnings of Grand Jury Secrecy
In the beginning, the grand jurors’ oath established the se-
crecy requirement. When grand juries were simply the monarch’s
                                                                                                             
83. “It was decided by Chief Justice Marshall, in [United States] v. Hill [Case No.
15,364], in 1809, that neither the 29th section of the [J]udiciary [A]ct of 1789 (1 Stat. 88),
nor the [A]ct of May 13th, 1800 (2 Stat. 82), applied to grand juries in the federal courts.”
United States v. Reed, 27 F. Cas. 727 (N.D.N.Y. 1852) (No. 16,134). But see YOUNGER, su-
pra note 56, at 46 (“The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that grand juries were to attend
each session of the circuit and district courts.”).
In fact, Congress has never passed a comprehensive act establishing the scope and pow-
ers of the federal grand jury. The next act to mention grand juries, the Act for the Pun-
ishment of Certain Crimes against the United States, enacted on April 30, 1790, required
the government to furnish a copy of the indictment and list of witnesses and jurors at least
three days before trial to a person accused of treason and two days before trial to a person
accused of other capital offenses. Ch. 9, § 29, 1 Stat. 112, 118 (1790). The Act also estab-
lished a three-year statute of limitations on indictments for treason or other capital of-
fenses, except for willful murder or forgery. Id. § 32, at 119. The Act does not include any
definition of the grand jury to which it refers. Similarly, the Act for Regulating Processes
in the Courts of the United States, and providing Compensations for the Officers of the
said Courts, and for Jurors and Witnesses, enacted on May 8, 1792, assumes the existence
of a grand jury and pays three dollars to the United States Marshall who summons a
grand jury, and fifty cents to each grand juror for attending in court plus five cents per
mile for travel. Ch. 36, § 3, 1 Stat. 275, 276-77 (1792). In 1826, Congress passed an Act to
Regulate the Summoning of Grand Jurors, in the District Courts, which reserved to the
district judges the authority to order the impaneling of grand juries. Ch. 86, § 1, 4 Stat.
188, 188-89 (1826). In 1895, Congress first established the size of federal grand juries and
the necessity for the concurrence of at least twelve grand jurors to find an indictment or
presentment. Act Regulating Proceedings in Criminal Cases and for Other Purpose, ch. 86,
§ 1, 13 Stat. 500, 500 (1865). Congress first began considering omnibus grand jury legisla-
tion in 1973, but could not develop a strong enough consensus to enact a general bill; the
last omnibus reform proposal was the ABA Bill that disappeared in the markup process in
1986. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ABA GRAND JURY POLICY AND MODEL ACT (1977-82) (2d
ed. 1982).
84. Ten amendments were ratified and adopted as the Bill of Rights in 1791.
85. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
86. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962).
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investigatory bodies,87 the grand jury oath did not include se-
crecy.88 Secrecy was part of the grand jury process to prevent es-
cape by suspected criminals.89 By the fourteenth century, how-
ever, secrecy was a part of the grand jurors’ oath.90 With the
shroud of secrecy came independence from the king. By 1681, the
monarch’s justices could no longer oversee jury deliberations,91
even though some justices still claimed the authority to conduct
the inquiry in public if the king so desired.92 At this time, the
                                                                                                             
87. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 112 (5th ed. 1956) (observing
that inquisition established by Clarendon Assize was an effective way of getting informa-
tion out of an unwilling populace).
88. Bracton, writing in the period 1220-1257, gives the oath sworn to by the twelve
men who informed the king of serious crimes:
Hear this, ye justices, that I will speak the truth as to that on which you shall
question me on the lord king’s behalf, and I will faithfully do that which you
shall command me on the lord king’s behalf, and for nothing will I fail so to do
to the utmost of my power, so help me God and these holy relics.
HENRY BRACTON, 2 ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 329 (George E. Woodbine ed.
& Samuel E. Thorne trans., Belknap Press 1968).
89. See EDWARDS, supra note 27, at 20-21. According to Bracton, the twelve men who
informed the king were
told in private that if anyone in their hundred or wapentake is suspected of
some crime they are to arrest him at once if they can. If they cannot, let them
give his name, and the names of all those who are under suspicion, privately to
the justices in a schedule and the sheriff will be ordered to arrest them at once
and bring them under arrest before the justices, that the latter may do justice
upon them.
BRACTON, supra note 88, at 329 (citations omitted).
90. Writing during the reign of Edward I, Britton stated that the grand jurors were
required to swear “that they will lawful presentment make of such chapters as shall be
delivered to them in writing, and that in this they will not fail for any love, hatred, fear,
reward, or promise, and that they will conceal the secrets, so help them God, and the
Saints.” 1 BRITTON 22 (Francis M. Nichols trans., Gaunt & Sons 1983) (1865).
91. At Lord Shaftesbury’s indictment hearings before the grand jury, the Lord Chief
Justice Pemberton stated to the jury foreman:
I will tell you, I take the Reason of that use for Grand Juries to examine the
Witnesses privately and out of Court, to comply with the Conveniencies of the
Court. . . . Therefore Gentlemen, there can be no kind of Reason why this Evi-
dence should not be given in Court. What you say concerning keeping your
Counsels, that is quite of another Nature, that is, your Debates, and those
things, there you shall be in private for to consider of what you hear publickly.
Proceedings against Anthony Earl of Shaftesbury, 33 Car. 2 (1681), in 2 STATE-TRYALS
828, 830-31 (Timothy Goodwin et al., London 1719).
92. See id. at 833:
At the Grand Jury called to indict Lord Shaftesbury, the Lord Chief Justice
Pemberton said to one of the Grand Jurors: as to your Counsels, that is, your
Debates, you are bound to conceal them: As to the King’s secrets, so long as he
will have them kept secret, you are bound to keep them so too; but it doth not
deprive the King of the Benefit of having it publick, if he have a Desire for it;
you don’t break your Oath, if the King will make it publick; you do not make it
publick; ’tis the King does it.
But see SOMERS, supra note 59, at 79 (arguing that oath of secrecy allowed jurors, “sifting
out all the Circumstances which the Law requires,” to prevent false accusations, especially
when judges censured jurors’ questions, calling them “trifles, impertinent, and unfit for
the Witnesses to speak to”).
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grand jurors’ oath93 resembled the basic form administered to
grand jurors in 1946, when the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure were first established.94
The purpose of the secrecy requirement was, in the earliest
days, interpolated primarily by legal scholars. Of the legal schol-
ars writing about the grand jury in the late seventeenth century,
John Somers is not only representative,95 but eminent,96 having
been read in both England and the colonies.97 In his monograph
on the grand jury, Somers described how grand jurors were sworn
not to disclose the subjects of the inquiry, the witnesses, or any of
the evidence.98 In addition, grand jurors were sworn not to reveal
                                                                                                             
93. Compare the 1649 oath given in England, “Ye shall truly inquire, and due pre-
sentment make of all such things as you are charged withall on the Queen’s behalf, the
Queen’s councell, your owne, and your fellowes, you shall well and truly keepe; and in all
other things the truth present, so help you God, and by the contents of this Booke,”
EDWARDS, supra note 27, at 99 (quoting BOOK OF OATHS (London, 1649)) (emphasis added),
and the English oath in 1682,
You shall diligently enquire, and true Presentment make of all such Articles,
matters and things as shall be given you in charge: And of all other matters
and things as shall come to your own knowledge, touching this present Service.
The Kings Council, your Fellows, and your own, you shall keep Secret: You
shall present no person for Hatred or Malice; neither shall you leave anyone
unpresented for Favour, or Affection, for Love, or Gain, or any hopes thereof;
but in all things you shall present the Truth, the whole Truth, and nothing but
the Truth to the best of your knowledge; so help you God,
SOMERS, supra note 59, at 25-26 (emphasis added), and the 1908 oath that required in part
that “[t]he United States’ counsel, your fellows’, and your own you shall keep secret,” At-
well v. United States, 162 F. 97, 98 (1908), with the 1945 oath given to the federal grand
jury attached to the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania,
You, as foreman of this inquest, for the body of the Middle District of Pennsyl-
vania, do swear, that you will diligently inquire, and true presentment make,
of such articles, matters, and things as shall be given you in charge or other-
wise come to your knowledge, touching the present service; the Government’s
counsel, your fellows’ and your own you shall keep secret; you shall present no
one for envy, hatred or malice; neither shall you leave any one unpresented for
fear, favor or affection, hope of reward or gain, but shall present all things
truly as they come to your knowledge, according to the best of your understand-
ing, so help you God,
Hon. Albert Williams Johnson, Charge to Grand Jury, 4 F.R.D. 243, 245 (1945) (emphasis
added).
94. See discussion infra part IV.
95. See supra note 56.
96. John Somers was appointed attorney-general in 1692, a member of the Privy
Council and Lord Keeper of the Great Seal of England in 1693, Lord Chancellor in 1697,
and in that same year was created Baron of Evesham. 4 LORD CAMPBELL, LIVES OF THE
LORD CHANCELLORS AND KEEPERS OF THE GREAT SEAL OF ENGLAND 499, 501 (7th ed. 1885);
5 id. at 22.
97. 5 id. at 22
98. SOMERS, supra note 59, at 43:
[T]he Kings Counsel, which by the Oath of the Grand Inquest is to be kept se-
cret, includeth all the persons offered to them to be indicted, and all the mat-
ters brought in Evidence before them, all circumstances whatsoever whereof
they are informed, which may any way conduce to the discovery of Offences; all
intimations given them of Abbettors and Encouragers of Treasons, Felonies, or
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their own personal knowledge, the knowledge of their fellow ju-
rors, their investigative plans, or their deliberations.99 The rea-
sons, according to Somers, were first, to prevent the flight of
criminals;100 second, to find out whether witnesses were biased;101
third, to be free from judicial oversight;102 fourth, to catch wit-
nesses in their lies;103 and fifth, to permit the full development of
evidence for a possible indictment some time in the future.104 Ac-
cording to Somers, all of these secrecy interests accrued to the
king.105 However, according to Somers, the interests which bene-
fited the king protected his subjects because the grand jury existed
                                                                                                             
Perjuries and Conspiracies, or of the Receivers, Harbourers, Nourishers, and
Concealers of such Criminals.
99. Id.:
Likewise the Oath which enjoins the Council of their Fellows, and their own to
be kept, implies that they shall not reveal any of their personal knowledge con-
cerning Offences or Offenders; nor their intentions to indict any man thereupon;
nor any of the Proposals and Advices amongst them of ways to enquire into the
truth of any matter before them, either about the Crimes themselves, or the ac-
cusers and Witnesses, or the party accused, nor the debates . . . .
100. Id. at 46: “[S]o it was necessary to prevent the Flight of Criminals; if the Evidence
against one that is accused should be publicly known, . . . his Confederates and Accomplices
might easily have notice of their danger, and take opportunity to escape from Justice.”
101. Id. at 46-47:
Yet the reason will be still more manifest for keeping secret the accusations and
the Evidence by the Grand Inquest, if it be well considered, how useful and neces-
sary it is for discovering truth in the Examinations of Witnesses in many, if not in
most cases that may come before them; when if by this Privacy Witnesses may be
examined in such manner and Order, as prudence and occasion direct; and no one
of them be suffered to know who hath been examined before him, nor what ques-
tions have been asked him, nor what answers he hath given, it may probably be
found out whether a witness hath been biased in his testimony by malice or Re-
venge, or the fear or favour of men in Power, or the love or hopes of Lucre and
gain in present or future, or Promises of impunity for some enourmous Crime.
102. Id. at 48-49:
Yet further, their private Examinations may discover truth out of some disagre-
ment of the Witnesses, when separately interrogated, and every of the Grand In-
quest ask them Questions for his own satisfaction about the matters which have
come to his particular knowledge, and this freely without Awe or Control of Judges,
or distrust of his own parts, or fear to be checked for asking impertinent questions.
103. Id. at 52:
[S]o that the Witness could not guess what they should be asked first, or last, nor
one conjecture what the other had said, . . . and then compare all their several an-
swers together, they might possibly discern marks enough of falsehood, to show
that their Testimonies ought not to be depended upon, where life is in question.
See also supra note 102.
104. Id. at 48-49:
Yet the same secrecy of Kings Council is no less necessary to reserve the guilty
for punishment; when the Evidence against any party accused is not manifest
and full, it may be kept without Prejudice under Secrecy until further Enquiry;
and if sufficient proof can afterwards be made of the Offence, an Indictment
may be found by a Grand Inquest, and the party brought to answer for it . . . .
105. “From hence may certainly be concluded that Secrecy in the Examinations and En-
quiries of Gr. Juries is in all respects for the Interest and advantage of the King.” Id. at 54.
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to protect the innocent accused106 just as much as the innocent
victims of crime.107 Secrecy made possible the discovery of truth108
and protected individuals from malicious or hateful prosecu-
tion.109 In sum, neither the king, the general public, nor the indi-
vidual accused could benefit by making public the proceedings of
a grand jury.
B.   Grand Jury Secrecy in Early American Jurisprudence
The Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment110 made grand
jury secrecy an implicit part of American criminal procedure. The
first challenges to the rule of secrecy were made by criminal de-
fendants seeking to set aside their indictments based upon insuf-
ficiency of evidence111 or prosecutorial misconduct before the
grand jury.112 Secrecy, hailed as the protector against monarchical
abuse, was, ironically, being challenged as a shield for that abuse.
 In one of the first reported secrecy cases, United States v.
Smith,113 decided fifteen years after the Bill of Rights was rati-
fied, a federal district court in New York indicated that an ac-
cused could attack the veil of secrecy. In Smith, the defendant
                                                                                                             
106. Id. at 63-64:
The Prosecutors themselves, notwithstanding their big words, and assuming to
themselves to be for the King, if their Prosecution shall be proved to be mali-
cious, or by Conspiracy against the Life or Fortune of the Accused, they are
therein against the King . . . . ’Tis esteemed in the Law one of the most odious
Offences against the King, to attempt in his name to destroy the Innocent, for
whose Protection he himself was ordained.
107. “[T]he King’s only benefits in finding out and punishing Offenders by Courts of
Justice are the preservation and support of the Government, the protection of the Inno-
cent, revenging their wrongs, and preventing further mischiefs by the terrors of exemplary
punishments.” Id. at 57.
108. Id. at 48; see also supra note 103.
109. SOMERS, supra note 59, at 47-48:
And the Falseness, Malice or ill Design of another, may be justly suspected
from his studiousness and difficulty in answering, his Artifice and cunning in
what he relates, not agreeable to his way of breeding and parts, his reserved,
indirect, and evasive Replies to easie Questions, his pretences of doubtfulness
and want of remembering things of such short dates, or such Notoriety, that
‘tis not credible he could be ignormant or forgetful of them.
110. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
111. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1186 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (challenging
indictment based upon illegal evidence); United States v. Farrington, 5 F. 343 (N.D.N.Y.
1881) (motioning to quash indictment because of insufficiency of evidence); United States
v. Kilpatrick, 16 F. 765 (W.D.N.C. 1883) (motioning to quash indictment because of illegal
evidence); United States v. Cobban, 127 F. 713 (D. Minn. 1904) (plea in abatement chal-
lenging sufficiency of evidence upon which indictment was based).
112. See, e.g., United States v. Wells, 163 F. 313 (D. Idaho 1908) (plea in abatement
based upon misconduct of the prosecutor before grand juror); United States v. Rintelen,
235 F. 787 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) (plea in abatement based upon allegation that district attorney
expressed to grand jury his opinion on questions of law and fact involved).
113. 27 F. Cas. 1186 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806).
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filed a plea in abatement challenging an indictment alleged to be
based upon illegal evidence.114 The prosecution argued against
lifting the veil of secrecy, claiming a plea in abatement could not
be made against grand jury actions because secrecy made grand
juries “independent and irresponsible.”115 The defense argued fair
process and contended that secrecy should not shield an improper
indictment.116 The court concluded that a challenge to the indict-
ment could be made,117 implicitly accepting the defense argument
that the rule of grand jury secrecy protected the individual accused
and, consequently, could be lifted where secrecy defeated that pur-
pose.118
As courts continued to adjudicate defendants’ motions for ac-
cess to grand jury material, two interests—other than the defen-
dant’s interest in fairness—emerged. First, there was a concern
that tampering with grand jurors might occur, eroding public
confidence in the grand jury institution.119 Second, blocking a de-
fendant’s access to grand jury materials would allow trials to be
free from perjury.120 The balance between the need for secrecy
and the need for disclosure121 began to tip against the defendant.
The majority of these early cases determined that the interests of
                                                                                                             
114. Id. at 1191.
115. Id. at 1187. Citing Lord Hale for the classification of pleas in abatement, the
prosecution argued, without authority, that the only remedy for grand jury abuse was
petit jury adjudication. Id.
116. Id. at 1188.
117. Id. The court eventually denied the plea on the merits. Id. at 1191.
118. Id. at 1191; see also United States v. Farrington, 5 F. 343, 346 (N.D.N.Y. 1881):
[A]uthorities . . . assert the right and duty of the court to exercise a salutary
supervision over the proceedings of a grand jury. It is only practicable to do
this by removing the veil of secrecy whenever evidence of what has transpired
before them becomes necessary to protect public or private rights.
See also United States v. Kilpatrick, 16 F. 765, 768, 777 (W.D.N.C. 1883):
As the grand jury is an informing and accusing body, which makes its inves-
tigations and holds its deliberations in secret, and is irresponsible for its offi-
cial action upon matters of fact, except before the tribunal of public opinion, it
is very important that its powers, duties, and methods of procedure should be
well understood, and be strictly confined within the conservative and salutary
limits imposed by law, which experience has shown to be necessary to subserve
the public good, and to accomplish a just and impartial administration of the
criminal law.
119. United States v. Terry, 39 F. 355, 357 (N.D. Cal. 1889) (allowing inquiry into suf-
ficiency of evidence before grand jury “would afford opportunity to tamper with the jury;
and . . . lessen the respect due to the forms and solemnities of judicial proceedings”).
120. United States v. Cobban, 127 F. 713, 718 (D. Minn. 1904) (“A more serious objec-
tion [than one to the traditional secrecy of grand jury investigations] is that a defendant
may thus learn what testimony exists against him, and be prepared to overcome it upon
the trial by perjury.”).
121. Accord In re Special 1952 Grand Jury, 22 F.R.D. 102, 106 (E.D. Pa. 1958) (“In
every case the court is called upon to balance two policies, the one requiring secrecy, the
other disclosure.”).
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law enforcement, which favored secrecy, outweighed the defen-
dant’s need for disclosure.122 These decisions were not surprising
in the context of the state of criminal law and procedure in the
150 years after the adoption of the Bill of Rights. They were in
keeping with the limited rules of criminal discovery123 and the
recognition that a trial by jury should safeguard the defendant.124
The issue of grand jury secrecy arose later in a First Amend-
ment context. In 1917, a Rhode Island federal district court ad-
dressed the issue of widespread public disclosure of grand jury
proceedings in United States v. Providence Tribune Co. 125 The
court cited the newspaper for contempt for printing an article di-
vulging information from a grand jury probe.126 Deciding that the
fair administration of justice required a finding of fact that the
newspaper was in contempt for making the secret grand jury
sessions public,127 the court held that the mere publication of the
article about the continuing grand jury probe was an obstruction
of justice.128 The court analyzed the historical justifications for
                                                                                                             
122. See McKinney v. United States, 199 F. 25 (8th Cir. 1912) (and sources cited
therein); Cox v. Vaught, 52 F.2d 562 (10th Cir. 1931) (and sources cited therein).
123. See United States v. Garrson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923):
Under our criminal procedure the accused has every advantage. While the
prosecution is held rigidly to the charge, he need not disclose the barest outline
of his defense. He is immune from question or comment on his silence; he can-
not be convicted when there is the least fair doubt in the minds of any one of
the twelve. Why in addition he should in advance have the whole evidence
against him to pick over at his leisure, and make his defense, fairly or foully, I
have never been able to see. No doubt grand juries err and indictments are ca-
lamities to honest men, but we must work with human beings and we can cor-
rect such errors only at too large a price. Our dangers do not lie in too little
tenderness to the accused. Our procedure has been always haunted by the
ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal dream. What we need to
fear is the archaic formalism and the watery sentiment that obstructs, delays,
and defeats the prosecution of crime.
See also In re Atwell, 140 F. 368, 376 (W.D.N.C. 1905), rev’d on other grounds, 162 F. 97
(4th Cir. 1908):
The defendant in a criminal action is no more entitled as a matter of right to
know the evidence of the prosecution until it is disclosed on the trial than is the
prosecution to be put in possession of the evidence which the defendant has in
mind to offer in his defense.
124. See United States v. Bolles, 209 F. 682 (W.D. Mo. 1913) (comparing grand jury
function to function of petit jury); see also United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649
(S.D.N.Y. 1923).
125. 241 F. 524 (D.R.I. 1917).
126. The article was entitled “Prominent Physicians Involved in Federal War on Co-
caine Dealers.” Id. at 525. The story named three people who had been arrested as a result
of the grand jury investigation, and reported that two of them might become prosecution
witnesses and that other prominent citizens would probably be arrested in the future. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 528: “That a person may have observed some act done by officials of the law,
which he was not sworn to keep secret, does not justify him in publishing it at large. It is
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grand jury secrecy and, perhaps influenced by John Somers’
treatise,129 listed six interests in secrecy: (1) preventing the es-
cape of offenders; (2) preventing the destruction of evidence; (3)
preventing tampering with witnesses; (4) preserving the reputa-
tions of innocent persons whose conduct comes under the grand
jury’s investigation; (5) encouraging witnesses to disclose their
full knowledge of possible wrongdoing; and (6) preventing undue
prejudice of the public jury pool.130 The interests in secrecy that
accrued to the government, the accused, and the grand jury were
weighed against the newspaper’s First Amendment interest in
publishing the grand jury information.131 The court found that all
of the historical interests weighed in favor of secrecy for the fair
administration of justice.132 In this context, no one would benefit
from the disclosure, except perhaps the newspaper through in-
creased sales. Thus, the decision fairly protected both the interest
in law enforcement and the individuals involved.
In the early 1930s, in United States v. Amazon Industrial
Chemical Corp. ,133 a criminal case, and In re Grand Jury Procee d-
ings,134 a civil regulatory case, the courts addressed problems that
did not involve the defendant’s access to grand jury matters. In
Amazon, the defendant challenged an indictment because a ste-
nographer had been present during the grand jury proceedings
and had transcribed the proceedings in violation of the secrecy
rule.135 The defendant claimed that the possibility of improper in-
fluence upon the grand jury had violated his constitutional
rights.136 Although it agreed that the opportunity for improper
influence was a real threat, the Maryland federal district court
nonetheless concluded that a defendant must prove actual preju-
dice to have an indictment dismissed.137 The court acknowledged
that the grand jury was adopted as a protection against oppres-
sive governmental action. It stated, however, that “[i]n this coun-
try, from the popular character of our institutions, there has sel-
dom been any contest between the government and the citizen
which required the existence of the grand jury as a protection
                                                                                                             
the duty of a citizen to assist, and not to frustrate, the work of the administration of jus-
tice.”
129. See supra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
130. Providence Tribune, 241 F. at 526.
131. Id.
132. See supra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
133. 55 F.2d 254 (D. Md. 1931).
134. 4 F. Supp. 283 (E.D. Pa. 1933).
135. Amazon, 55 F.2d at 258.
136. Id. at 261.
137. Id. at 263-64.
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against oppressive action of the government.”138 Evaluating the
reasons for grand jury secrecy set forth in Providence Tribune ,
the Amazon court concluded that these reasons were for the pro-
tection of the grand jury itself as an independent representative
of the public for finding truth, and that none were based upon
constitutional guarantees for the criminally accused.139 The court
cloaked grand jury proceedings with a presumption of regular-
ity,140 which inherently placed the fairness of the proceeding in
the discretion of a prosecutor, the representative of the executive
branch.141
The Amazon court’s analysis of the purposes for secrecy
seemingly contradicts its conclusion that secrecy has no basis in
                                                                                                             
138. Id. at 263. The court’s conclusory statement that oppressive government action is
too rare to require the protective procedure of a grand jury is contrary to the concerns of
the founders and certainly dubious in times of crisis. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (using “pressing public necessity” to seize property of all persons
of Japanese ancestry in certain West Coast areas and intern owners in concentration
camps). For a discussion of the abuse of the grand jury for “political crimes” prosecutions,
see generally Federal Grand Jury: Hearings on H.R.J. Res. 46 and H.R. 1277 Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (investigating reform after allegations of abuse).
The hearing included a report that analyzed certain cases where grand jury abuse alleg-
edly occurred. Id. at 730-35. For information on abuse of the grand jury by the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation, see Right to Privacy Proposals Of The Privacy Protection Study
Commission: Hearings on H.R. 10076 Before Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Govern-
ment Operations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 18-31 (1978). Whether the grand jury fulfills its
function is beyond the scope of this Article, but for an interesting comment on that issue,
see Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 260 (1995).
139. Amazon, 55 F.2d at 261. See also Leipold, supra note 138, at 261:
It is obvious that the basis of all but the last of these reasons for secrecy is pro-
tection of the grand jury itself, as the direct independent representative of the
public as a whole, rather than of those brought before the grand jury. Of
course, these latter are intended directly to share in the benefits from this rule
of secrecy, but it is to be noted that none of the reasons for it are founded upon
an inherent right in the individual who is being investigated to the same con-
stitutional safeguards that are unquestionably his when he is brought to trial
for a given crime.
140. Amazon, 55 F.2d at 262-64; accord United States v. Olmstead, 7 F.2d 756, 759
(W.D. Wa. 1925) (and sources cited therein).
141. A presumption of regularity is difficult to rebut without access to the grand jury
transcripts. See United States v. American Medical Ass’n, 26 F. Supp. 429, 431 (D.D.C.
1939). The defendants in American Medical Ass’n filed a plea in abatement alleging prose-
cutorial misconduct before the grand jury, but did not have the requisite proof. Id. The
court, in refusing to grant the plea, stated:
[t]he defendants complain that with the lips of jurors sealed and the transcript
closed to them they cannot obtain the true facts except by aid of the court. But
it must be remembered that sound reasons of public policy in the administra-
tion of justice lie back of the rules which forbid free access to these channels of
information.
Id. Not only is the presumption difficult to rebut, but one commentator concludes that ju-
rors defer to prosecutors’ judgments on the critical issue they are asked to decide, whether
or not an indictment should issue. See Leipold, supra note 138, at 264.
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the constitutional rights protecting the criminally accused. Se-
crecy protects the ultimate truth-finding function of the grand
jury.142 This truth-finding function, however, is intended to pro-
tect the individual against unfounded prosecutions. Moreover, the
Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person shall be held to an-
swer for a crime unless on an indictment of a grand jury. This
constitutional protection also was established to protect the indi-
vidual against unfounded prosecutions.143 Therefore, secrecy is
arguably based upon the Fifth Amendment right of the individual
to be free from unfounded prosecutions.
Like many early decisions, Amazon distinguished between the
grand jury process and the stringent due process requirements of
a criminal trial.144 This analysis, when viewed in the context of
the unpredictable “secrecy” jurisprudence of that era, erroneously
emphasizes that the criminal trial process should serve as a
screen against unfounded prosecutions caused by failure of the
grand jury process. That error is compounded when the analysis
is applied to the civil arena.
The issue of disclosing grand jury materials for use in a civil ac-
tion was first addressed two years later, in In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings.145 In that case, the government initiated regulatory pro-
ceedings to revoke Union City Brewing Company’s beer license.146
Prior to these proceedings, prosecutors had conducted a grand jury
investigation into possible violations of the National Prohibition
Act.147 The grand jury elicited information relevant to the revoca-
tion hearing, and the supervising court, upon the agency’s motion,
allowed disclosure of the grand jury materials for use in that
hearing.148 The court, citing criminal cases,149 claimed authority for
disclosing grand jury materials to the government agency in the
name of justice.150 The court, almost echoing Amazon, stated:
                                                                                                             
142. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
143. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962).
144. See sources cited supra note 124.
145. 4 F. Supp. 283 (E.D. Pa. 1933).
146. Id. at 284.
147. Id. at 283.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 284 (citing United States v. Farrington, 5 F. 343 (N.D.N.Y. 1881) (granting
disclosure to the defendant to quash the indictment); Atwell v. United States, 162 F. 97
(4th Cir. 1908) (refusing to hold a grand juror in contempt for disclosing information to de-
fense counsel upon which to base a Motion to Quash the indictment); United States v.
Perlman, 247 F. 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (granting disclosure for use in perjury trial against a
grand jury witness); Metzler v. United States, 64 F.2d 203 (9th Cir. 1933) (allowing disclo-
sure of grand jury testimony in a criminal trial)).
150. “It is sufficient to say that the rule of [grand jury] secrecy has long since been re-
laxed by permitting disclosure whenever the interest of justice requires. . . . It is my con-
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The rule of secrecy, it will be noted, was designed for the pro-
tection of the witnesses who appear and for the purpose of al-
lowing a wider and freer scope to the grand jury itself, and was
never intended as a safeguard for the interests of the accused
or of any third person.151
Therefore, the court refused to accept the contention that a fun-
damental purpose in protecting the grand jury’s “wider and freer
scope” of investigation was ultimately to protect the accused
against oppressive prosecutions.152
The early case law thus began to point out different secrecy
considerations in criminal and civil cases, as well as the compet-
ing interests of law enforcement and the protection of the indi-
vidual. When a government attorney seeks access to grand jury
materials for use in a civil regulatory proceeding, the central in-
terest from a defendant’s point of view is not protection of the in-
vestigative role of the grand jury; rather, the interest is whether
grand jury information may be used against an individual to ini-
tiate a civil enforcement action, where the burden of proof on the
government is a preponderance of the evidence rather than proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.153 An examination of this important
question presents due process considerations relating to the fun-
damental fairness of disclosure of grand jury materials for use in
civil proceedings.154 Congress first began to address these secrecy
issues in 1946.
                                                                                                             
sidered judgment that the ends of justice can be furthered by permitting the disclosure of
this testimony.” Id.
151. Id. at 284-85.
152. Id. at 284: “The inquisitorial power of the grand jury is the most valuable function
which it possesses to-day and, far more than any supposed protection which it gives to the
accused, justifies its survival as an institution.”
153. In John Somers’ seventeenth-century explanation of the grand jury, secrecy pro-
tected the grand jury’s capacity for finding the truth. See SOMERS, supra note 59, at 46-47;
see also supra note 101. Each enumerated secrecy interest served that purpose regardless
of whether the particular interested party was the monarch, the institution, or the people
called before the grand jury. See supra notes 99-109 and accompanying text. The common
rationale driving each enumerated secrecy interest showed that any relaxation of the se-
crecy rule would hinder the truth- seeking function of the grand jury. See supra notes 100-
03 and accompanying text. It follows then, that any practice which might stifle that ulti-
mate function is a legitimate interest in grand jury secrecy. Exercise of the grand jury
powers to elicit testimony, which may be used in a proceeding with lesser safeguards than
that which screens the grand jury’s actions, thus becomes a primary interest in secrecy be-
cause such a practice would encourage misuse of those powers.
154. In Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), the court determined that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not require states to initiate criminal
proceedings by the grand jury process, yet it did not address the issue of fundamental fair-
ness presented by parallel proceedings. Id. at 534-35.
Similarly, cases in which the courts provided no due process safeguards in the grand
jury process did not present the unique issues that arise when the extraordinarily broad
powers of the grand jury are used to gain evidence for a civil proceeding. See, e.g., McKin-
1996]                    GRAND JURY SECRECY 23
IV.   1946 CODIFICATION OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
The Supreme Court created the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which became effective on March 21, 1946.155 The pur-
pose of the Rules, as stated in Rule 2, was “to provide for the just
determination of every criminal proceeding . . . to secure simplic-
ity in procedure, fairness in administration and the elimination of
unjustifiable expense and delay.”156 The Rules balanced the need
for enforcing laws against the necessity of safeguarding funda-
mental rights of the accused.157 The Department of Justice be-
                                                                                                             
ney v. United States, 199 F. 25, 28-29 (8th Cir. 1912) (finding that “[d]ue process of law
within the meaning of the Constitution does not even embrace such an important safe-
guard as exemption from compulsory self-incrimination, much less mere rules of procedure
like those pertaining to evidence before grand juries”); United States v. Mandujano, 425
U.S. 564, 581 (1976) (stating that neither target nor witness has a right to have counsel
present in grand jury room); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 351-52 (1974)
(stating that Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply to grand juries); United
States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 189 (1977) (finding no requirement that target be in-
formed of status as target); United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1992) (stating
that prosecutor is under no obligation to present exculpatory evidence to grand jury).
One of the more alarming concerns in this context is the potential use of compelled, im-
munized, and self-incriminating grand jury testimony in a civil trial. See, e.g, Pillsbury Co.
v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248 (1983) (finding that immunized grand jury testimony did not pos-
sess immunity in subsequent civil trial, even where grand jury transcript formed basis for
civil deposition questions; defendant must be granted new immunity by federal prosecutor
for civil trial or invoke Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination); Helene
Schwartz, Note, Recent Development: Disclosure and Civil Use of Immunized Testimony,
35 VAND. L. REV. 1211 (1982).
Other concerns include the potential use of biased and untested testimony, see Mandu-
jano, 425 U.S. at 581 (finding that neither target nor witness has right to have counsel
present in grand jury room), and the potential use of illegally seized evidence to form the
basis of civil discovery, see Calandra, 414 U.S. at 351-52 (stating that Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule does not apply to grand juries).
155. In 1940, Congress authorized the Supreme Court to develop rules to regulate
criminal procedure in the federal courts. Act of June 29, 1940, 54 Stat. 688 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-72 (1994)). In 1941, the Court appointed the “Advisory
Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure, Supreme Court of the United States,” which
included “eighteen representative members of the Bar including defense counsel, district
attorneys, prosecutors, judges, former judges, and law professors.” 1 MADELEINE J. WILKEN
& NICHOLAS TRIFFIN, DRAFTING HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
xi (1991). The Advisory Committee worked in cooperation with city and state bar commit-
tees, as well as circuit and district court committees. 1 id. at xii. The Committee submitted
two preliminary drafts and a final reported draft to the Supreme Court, which prescribed
the “truly final” version of the Rules on December 26, 1944. 1 id. at xii-xv. The Attorney
General then reported the Court’s final version to Congress on January 3, 1945. 1 id. at xv.
The Rules became effective on March 21, 1946. 1 id.
156. FED. R. CRIM. P. 2; see also Hon. Harold Judson, Assistant Solicitor General of the
United States, Improvement in Criminal Procedure From the Viewpoint of The Department
of Justice, 5 F.R.D. 39, 42 (1945).
157. Alexander Holtzoff, Special Assistant to the Attorney General of the United
States; Secretary of the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Re-
form of Federal Criminal Procedure, 3 F.R.D. 445, 446 (1944):
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lieved such a balance was obtained under the new Rules.158 To
achieve this balance, however, a great deal of preexisting common
law criminal procedure was simplified, and some outmoded
technical rules were completely eliminated.159 Significantly, the
rule of grand jury secrecy was made into positive law in subsec-
tions (d) and (e) of Rule 6.160
As adopted, Rule 6 included two grand jury secrecy provisions.
The first provision limited who could be present during grand
jury sessions,161 while the second imposed a general rule of se-
                                                                                                             
The formulation and regulation of criminal procedure has broad implications
and wide ramifications. It involves more than merely the manner of drawing
pleadings and details of practice. In a larger sense, it must necessarily crystallize
a philosophy of administration of criminal justice. It must arrive at a nice and
well-balanced adjustment between two basic factors. On the one hand, it must be
conducive to a simple, effective, and expeditious prosecution of crimes. Perpetra-
tors of crimes must be detected, apprehended and punished. The conviction of the
guilty must not be unduly delayed. Criminals should not go unwhipped of justice
because of technicalities having no connection with the merits of the accusation.
The protection of the law-abiding citizen from the ravages of the criminal is one of
the principal functions of government. Any form of criminal procedure that un-
necessarily hampers and unduly hinders the successful fulfillment of this duty
must be discarded or radically changed. On the other hand, the converse factor
consists in the necessity of preserving and safeguarding the fundamental rights of
the accused. These rights, which are derived from the basic Anglo-Saxon princi-
ples of fair play and are in part embodied in the Constitution of the United States,
are intended, first, to protect the innocent against an erroneous conviction, and,
second, to assure the use of civilized standards in dealing even with the guilty. No
system of criminal procedure may be deemed successful unless it properly bal-
ances these two opposing forces.
158. Improvement in Criminal Procedure, 5 F.R.D. at 42-43:
The purpose of any rules of criminal procedure should be to see that any indi-
vidual accused of crime is given a fair and speedy hearing. There are two inter-
ests to be served in criminal proceedings: (1) the interest of the individual ac-
cused, and (2) the interest of the public which has been harmed. A fair criminal
procedure will insure that neither interest suffers at the expense of the other. .
. . The advantages which [the new Rules] offer in achieving simply and effi-
ciently the ends of justice, while carefully protecting and preserving the fun-
damental rights of defendants under our system of jurisprudence, should im-
press themselves inevitably upon lawyers throughout the country.
When the new Rules were substantially completed, the former Attorney General praised
them and advocated approval. Hon. Homer Cummings, The Third Great Adventure, 3
F.R.D. 283, 284 (1943).
159. Reform of Federal Criminal Procedure, 3 F.R.D. at 447:
The simplification of procedure has been accomplished, however, without sac-
rifice of any safeguards that properly surround a defendant in a criminal case.
In fact, in some respects the new rules have cemented and strengthened the
protection accorded the defendant.
160. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d)-(e).
161. 18 U.S.C. § 687 (1946) (current version at 18 U.S.C. app. (1994)):
Who May be Present. Attorneys for the government, the witness under ex-
amination, interpreters when needed, and, for the purpose of taking the evi-
dence, a stenographer may be present while the grand jury is in session, but no
person other than the jurors may be present while the grand jury is deliberat-
ing or voting.
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crecy with specific and limited exceptions.162 Civil adjudication
and administrative regulation aided by the grand jury process
were not widespread common law practices and were not con-
templated in the new procedural grand jury rule.163
It was even unclear whether the common law permitted prose-
cuting attorneys in grand jury proceedings when the Constitution
was adopted,164 but the practice had become widespread by
1946.165 Consequently, Rule 6 contained an exception that allowed
automatic disclosure of “matters occurring before the grand jury,
other than its deliberations and the vote of any juror”166 to
“attorneys for the government.”167 A second exception allowed
witnesses to disclose their own testimony in the interests of jus-
tice.168 The third exception allowed disclosure as directed by the
                                                                                                             
For an early analysis of cases construing Rule 6(d), see Lester B. Orfield, The Federal
Grand Jury, 22 F.R.D. 343, 378-82, 423-25 (undated). For a more recent analysis, see An-
drea G. Nadel, Annotation, Presence of Persons Not Authorized by Rule 6(d) of Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure During Session of Grand Jury as Warranting Dismissal of
Indictment, 68 A.L.R. FED. 798 (1984).
162. 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1953) (including Rule 6(e)) (current version at 18 U.S.C. app.
(1994)):
Disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury other than its delib-
erations and the vote of any juror may be made to the attorneys for the gov-
ernment for use in the performance of their duties. Otherwise a juror, attorney,
interpreter or stenographer may disclose matters occurring before the grand
jury only when so directed by the court preliminary to or in connection with a
judicial proceeding or when permitted by the court at the request of the defen-
dant upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the in-
dictment because of matters occurring before the grand jury.
163. When the drafting committee was preparing the original 1946 Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, it did not occur to them to make provisions for the civil use of grand
jury materials, and nothing in the drafting history shows a common law interest in the
civil use of the grand jury process. See 7 WILKEN & TRIFFIN, supra note 155, at 241-43.
164. See United States v. Huston, 28 F.2d 451, 452 (N.D. Ohio 1928) (allowing prose-
cution to assist with presentation of evidence but finding that its participation in delib-
eration or vote-taking by the members of the grand jury was not allowed at time of adop-
tion of Fifth Amendment). But cf. United States v. Wells, 163 F. 313, 324 (D. Idaho 1908):
“The rights of the defendants are to be measured by the grand jury system as it existed
and was understood at the time of its adoption. At the common law the prosecutor had no
right to attend the sessions.” Note, however, that Wells cited as authority George J. Ed-
wards, Jr.’s The Grand Jury, which suggested that the common law never guaranteed the
power of a prosecutor to present an indictment before a grand jury. EDWARDS, supra note
24, at 114-17. See also Richard M. Calkins, Grand Jury Secrecy, 63 MICH. L. REV. 455, 457
(1965) (observing that grand juries commonly received evidence outside presence of prose-
cutor).
165. “It has become the practice for the United States Attorney to attend grand jury
hearings . . . .” Orfield, supra note 161, at 346 (referring to history of enactment of Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)).
166. 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1953) (including Rule 6) (current version at 18 U.S.C. app. (1994)).
167. Id. “Government attorneys are entitled to disclosure of grand jury proceedings,
other than the deliberations and the votes of the jurors, inasmuch as they may be present
in the grand jury room during the presentation of evidence. The rule continues this prac-
tice.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) advisory committee’s note.
168. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) advisory committee’s note.
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supervising court “preliminarily to or in connection with a judi-
cial proceeding.”169 The fourth and final exception, no doubt influ-
enced by the conflict in earlier case law, allowed disclosure to a
defendant for the purpose of dismissing an invalid indictment.170
When criminal grand jury investigations overlap with civil
regulatory inquiries, the government has both procedural and
cost-saving incentives to seek grand jury discovery in parallel
civil or administrative proceedings.171 The first and third excep-
tions allowing disclosure to “attorneys for the government” and
“preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding” have
therefore resulted in prolific litigation seeking broad judicial con-
struction of the phrases.172 The drafting history of Rule 6(e) shows
how the secrecy requirement was intended to limit grand jury ac-
cess by Department of Justice civil attorneys and other federal
agency attorneys.
The preliminary draft of Rule 6(e) was proposed as Rule 7(e).173
As distributed to the bench and bar, preliminary Rule 7(e) pro-
vided in part that:
A juror, attorney, interpreter, clerk, or stenographer may
disclose matters occurring before the grand jury only when so
directed by the court preliminarily to or in connection with an-
other judicial proceeding or when permitted by the court at the
request of the defendant upon a showing that grounds may ex-
ist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters
occurring before the grand jury, and in that case disclosure
may also be made to the attorney for the government.174
Government attorneys and judges were concerned about this
language,175 which seemed to preclude the U.S. Attorney present-
                                                                                                             
169. “The necessity for disclosure of grand jury proceedings is left to the discretion of
the judge in those situations where disclosure is permitted by the terms of the rule.” 4
WILKEN & TRIFFIN, supra note 155, at 21 (citing Note to Subdivision 6(e), Notes of Advi-
sory Committee on Rules, second preliminary draft).
170. 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1953) (codified as amended 18 U.S.C. app. (1994)).
171. BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 22, § 8:01.
172. See Richard Neumeg, Annotation, Who Are “Government Personnel” Within Mean-
ing of Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to Whom Matters Oc-
curring Before Grand Jury May Be Disclosed, 54 A.L.R. FED 805 (1981); see also Bruce I.
McDaniel, Annotation, What Is “What Is Judicial Proceeding” Within Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Permitting Disclosure of Matters Occurring Before
Grand Jury When So Directed by Court Preliminarily to or in Connection with Such Pro-
ceeding, 52 A.L.R. FED. 411 (1981).
173. Rule 7 became Rule 6 in the Second Preliminary Draft distributed in 1944. See
generally WILKEN & TRIFFIN, supra note 155 (contrasting Rule 7(e) in volumes 1-3 with
Rule 6(e) in volume 4); see also United States v. Sells 463 U.S. 418, 468 (1983) (Burger, J.,
dissenting).
174. See 1 WILKEN & TRIFFIN, supra note 155, at 20-21.
175. See generally 2 id. at 58-61; 3 id. at 352-57.
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ing a criminal case to the grand jury from obtaining grand jury
transcripts without a court order.176 Also, when Congress enacted
the Rules, the courts were already experiencing the phenomenon
of parallel criminal and civil (or administrative) proceedings
arising from a common factual nexus.177 Written comments sub-
mitted to the drafters focused attention on the potential use of
criminal grand jury information in civil and administrative
agency investigations and litigation.178 In fact, one prescient U.S.
                                                                                                             
176. “As the proposed rule now reads, it would prevent the United States Attorney
[from] obtaining a transcript from his own reporter, consulting with his Assistants, or con-
ferring with agents of the F.B.I. and the like. Will that further the administration of jus-
tice?” 2 id. at 59 (quoting Letter from Joseph T. Votava, U.S. Attorney for the District of
Nebraska, to Alexander Holtzoff, Secretary, Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure (July 22, 1943)). See also 3 id. at 353 (quoting Letter from Hon. Orie
L. Phillips, U.S. Circuit Judge for the Tenth Circuit, to the ABA Institute on Rules of
Criminal Procedure (Aug. 24, 1943)); 3 id. at 354 (quoting Letter from Robert S. Rubin,
Special Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission, to Alexander Holtzoff, Secretary,
Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (Sept. 14, 1943)) (“Nor is
it clear whether the United States Attorney has to obtain an order of court before he can
get a copy of the transcript of the grand jury proceedings.”); 3 id. at 355 (quoting Letter
from Hon. Joseph F. Deeb, U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Michigan, to Alexan-
der Holtzoff, Secretary, Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
(Sept. 10, 1943)) (“[S]ome exception should be made because as the rule now stands, the
stenographer may be precluded from giving, without an order of the Court, a transcript of
his notes to the United States Attorney.”); 3 id. (quoting Letter from Hon. Paul J. McCor-
mick, U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of California, to the Judicial Conference
for the Ninth Circuit (Sept. 9, 1943)) (“If the rule contemplates a restriction on the United
States Attorney’s use of the transcript, I believe that he should be excepted from the pro-
vision requiring the permission of the court.”).
177. See, e.g., In Re Grand Jury Proceedings, 4 F. Supp. 283 (E.D. Pa. 1933); see also
Breck P. McAllister, The Big Case: Procedural Problems in Antitrust Litigation, 64 HARV.
L. REV. 27 (1950) (describing three large antitrust actions that began in 1944 and 1947);
Urban A. Lavery, The Administrative Process: Factual Analysis of the “Report of Attorney
General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure”, 1 F.R.D. 651, 653-54 (undated) (listing
51 administrative agencies and federal departments in existence that have been exercising
administrative powers since 1789).
178. Securities Exchange Commission Special Counsel Robert S. Rubin wrote: “I be-
lieve that the clause ‘preliminarily to or in connection with another judicial proceeding’
(lines 64-66), may cause considerable difficulty in application. For example, is it intended
that judicial proceedings should include civil actions? I think such use of grand jury pro-
ceedings would be most inappropriate.” 3 WILKEN & TRIFFIN, supra note 155, at 354
(quoting Letter from Robert S. Rubin, Special Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, to Alexander Holtzoff, Secretary, Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure (Sept. 14, 1943)). Rubin noted that:
The Commission has specifically directed me to request the amendment of
proposed Rule 7(d) in order to permit attendance before the grand jury of rep-
resentatives of the government agency which investigated the case to assist the
United States Attorney or other attorney for the government. Such a change
certainly would be of immeasurable aid both to the United States Attorney and
the grand jury.
3 id. at 352. U.S. District Judge Paul J. McCormick wrote that “Rule 7, subdivision (e),
provides that an attorney may disclose matters occurring before the grand jury only when
so directed by the court. As a matter of common practice the United States Attorney uses
the grand jury transcript rather freely with investigators and attorneys for the various
governmental agencies.” 3 id. at 355 (quoting Letter from Hon. Paul J. McCormick, U.S.
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Attorney specifically recommended tightening the language to
preclude the possibility that any attorney associated with the
government, whether presenting a criminal case or not, might lift
the shroud of secrecy and gain access to grand jury materials for
civil enforcement purposes.179 The Advisory Committee ultimately
changed the language of the draft.180 As rewritten, the second
preliminary draft of what is now Rule 6(e) included a new first
sentence that opened the grand jury proceedings to the “attorneys
for the government.”181
As finally adopted, the Rule specified that grand jury materi-
als could be disclosed to attorneys for the government “for use in
the performance of their duties.”182 By way of guidance, the Advi-
sory Committee’s notes183 stated: “Government attorneys are en-
titled to disclosure of grand jury proceedings, other than the de-
liberations and the votes of the jurors, inasmuch as they may be
                                                                                                             
District Judge for the Southern District of California, to the Judicial Conference for the
Ninth Circuit (Sept. 9, 1943)).
179. “This proposal should be clarified so it will not be construed to mean that any attor-
ney working for the Government can appear before a Grand Jury, by adding the words ‘any
attorney authorized to prosecute criminal cases.’ ” 3 id. at 355 (quoting Letter from Victor E.
Anderson, U.S. Attorney for the District of Minnesota, to Alexander Holtzoff, Secretary, Advi-
sory Committee on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (Aug. 20, 1943)).
180. Disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury other than its delib-
erations and the vote of any juror may be made to the attorneys for the gov-
ernment for use in the performance of their duties. Otherwise a juror, attorney,
interpreter or stenographer may disclose matters occurring before the grand
jury only when so directed by the court preliminarily to or in connection with a
judicial proceeding or when permitted by the court at the request of the defen-
dant upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the in-
dictment because of matters occurring before the grand jury. The court may di-
rect that an indictment shall be kept secret until the defendant is in custody or
has given bail, and in that event the clerk shall seal the indictment and no per-
son shall disclose the finding of the indictment except when necessary for the
issuance and execution of a warrant or summons.
4 id. at 15-16 (quoting 2d Preliminary Draft of Rule 6(e), formerly Rule 7(e)).
181. “Disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury other than its deliberations
and the vote of any juror may be made to the attorneys for the government for use in the
performance of their duties.” 4 id. (quoting 2d Preliminary Draft of Rule 6(e), formerly
Rule 7(e)). Consequently, the drafters dropped the earlier draft language that permitted
access to the grand jury by the attorney for the government to rebut a claim by a defen-
dant seeking to quash an indictment. Because the new language broadened the govern-
ment attorney’s access for all criminal law purposes, it no longer needed to address the
individual limited exceptions allowing access.
182. 18 U.S.C. § 687 (1946) (current version at 18 U.S.C. app. (1994)).
183. The notes to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were the last project on
which the Advisory Committee worked. The Committee intended them “to indicate . . .
which provisions of the Rules are restatements of existing law, to define the extent of any
changes, and to the extent that any of these Rules, involve innovations, to ascertain their
background and source.” 1 WILKEN & TRIFFIN, supra note 155, at xv-xvi (citation omitted).
As Wilken and Triffen point out, “[t]he [Advisory Committee’s] Introductory Statement . . .
also makes very clear that the Supreme Court had no hand in supervising or revising the
preparation of the Notes and did not approve or sponsor them.” 1 id. at xvi.
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present in the grand jury room during the presentation of evi-
dence.”184 Otherwise, the Rule required secrecy except under
court-supervised disclosure.185 Given the concerns the Advisory
Committee addressed186—as well as the underlying purpose of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,187 the arguably defendant-
oriented purpose behind the witness exception,188 and the lack of
a civil enforcement agency exception189—the Committee intended
the language adopted in Rule 6(e) to allow automatic grand jury
disclosure to government attorneys only for criminal prosecutions
on which they were working.190
V.   INTERPRETATIONS OF THE 1946 SECRECY RULE
In the 1940s, the creation of many administrative agencies
with overlapping criminal and civil enforcement powers exacer-
bated the potential use of grand jury information by civil gov-
                                                                                                             
184. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) advisory committee’s note.
185. The first sentence of the 1946 version of Rule 6(e) provided for automatic disclosure
to attorneys for the government, while the second sentence of the 1946 version of Rule 6(e)
provided for court-ordered disclosure. Rules of Criminal Procedure for the District Courts of
the United States (1946), reprinted in 7 WILKEN & TRIFFIN, supra note 155, at 139-40.
186. See supra notes 176, 174-75.
187. See supra note 157 and accompanying text; see also supra note 158.
188. See William W. Barron, Proceedings of the Institute on Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 5 F.R.D. 150, 151 (1945):
Rule 6(e) . . . imposes no obligation of secrecy on a witness. . . .
This is a step forward. Inexperienced prosecutors have been known to caution
witnesses not to talk to anybody about the case. Defense counsel have some-
times omitted proper preparation for trial because of doubt of their right to ex-
amine witnesses before trial or because of the refusal of witnesses on advice of
the prosecutor to talk. Certainly defense counsel in his investigation of the
facts of the offense charged against his client, has every right to talk to every
witness who can shed light on those facts. This right should be protected and
enforced by the court whenever necessary for the due and seemly administra-
tion of justice.
189. The Advisory Committee was specifically requested to create such an exception: “I
would like to urge the Committee to change the present Rule 6(e) so as to permit disclosure
of such matters in connection with federal administrative proceedings.” 6 WILKEN &
TRIFFIN, supra note 155, at 12 (quoting Letter from Robert S. Rubin, Special Counsel, Se-
curities and Exchange Commission, to Alexander Holtzoff, Secretary, Advisory Committee
on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (May 24, 1944)).
190. Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 54(c), an “[a]ttorney for the govern-
ment” includes “the Attorney General, an authorized assistant of the Attorney General, a
United States Attorney, [and] an authorized assistant of a United States Attorney.” FED.
R. CRIM. P. 54(c). To justify a broader construction of Rule 6(e), the Department of Justice
eventually combined Rule 6(e) with Rule 54(c), as well as 5 U.S.C. § 310, which gave dis-
cretion to the Attorney General to structuring the Department of Justice:
It should be noted that, until the enunciation of the . . . principles of law by our
highest court in [United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958)], the
United States Department of Justice had held the view that the . . . Government
had the legal right to use the Grand Jury simply to elicit evidence in and for a
civil case.
United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 187 F. Supp. 55, 56 (D.N.J. 1960).
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ernment attorneys.191 Two issues emerged: first, whether Con-
gress intended Department of Justice civil attorneys and other
administrative agency attorneys to have access to grand jury ma-
terials for preparation of civil cases (and if so, whether they were
to have automatic access as an “attorney for the government”);
and second, by what standard would a private party be allowed
access to grand jury information. The lower courts disagreed over
whether to permit access to grand jury materials, regardless of
whether the party seeking disclosure was public192 or private.193
In In re April 1956 Term Grand Jury ,194 the Seventh Circuit
vigorously protected grand jury secrecy in a case that continued
for almost eight years. The litigation involved criminal and civil
investigations of alleged tax evasion.195 The Department of Jus-
tice had appointed Treasury Department agents who were ac-
tively involved in both inquiries as “assistants” to the grand
jury.196 The grand jury subpoenaed documents—many of which
                                                                                                             
191. John C. Grabow, Congressional Silence and the Search for Legislative Intent: A
Venture into “Speculative Unrealities,” 64 B.U. L. REV. 737, 758-59 (1984) (citing KENNETH
CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.3 (2d ed. 1978)).
192. Compare In re April 1956 Term Grand Jury, 239 F.2d 263, 272 (7th Cir. 1956)
(“The safeguard of secrecy, in the interest of the public, continues even after the grand
jury has completed its efforts and therefore forbids any use in civil proceedings of infor-
mation derived by or through an examination of records and documents made under the
authority of the grand jury.”) and United States v. Crolich, 101 F. Supp. 782, 784 (S.D.
Ala. 1952) (refusing to disclose grand jury materials to Mobile County Board of Commis-
sioners for investigation of alleged election corruption because county administrative pro-
ceedings were not ‘judicial proceedings’ within meaning of Rule 6(e)) with Doe v. Rosen-
berry, 255 F.2d 118, 120 (2d Cir. 1958) (“We cannot agree that the Rule should be limited
to criminal proceedings; on the contrary we hold that, prima facie, the term ‘judicial pro-
ceeding’ includes any proceeding determinable by a court, having for its object the compli-
ance of any person, subject to judicial control, with standards imposed upon his conduct in
the public interest, even though such compliance is enforced without the procedure appli-
cable to the punishment of crime.”). See also Application of Kelly, 19 F.R.D. 269, 270
(S.D.N.Y. 1956) (allowing disclosure when federal prosecutor represented that only his
staff, FBI agents, and IRS agents would access materials obtained pursuant to grand jury
subpoena duces tecum); In re Bullock, 103 F. Supp. 639, 643 (D.D.C. 1952) (allowing lim-
ited disclosure of grand jury transcript to D.C. Board of Commissioners to investigate po-
lice corruption).
193. Compare United States v. General Motors Corp., 15 F.R.D. 486, 488 (D. Del. 1954)
(denying civil disclosure of grand jury transcripts for impeachment because defendant had
other discovery tools available that would not jeopardize effective grand jury inquiry and
deliberation) and United States v. Radio Corp. of Am., 21 F.R.D. 103, 104 (E.D. Pa. 1957)
(denying access to grand jury witness statements because defendant had list of witnesses
and could depose them) with United States v. Ben Grunstein & Sons Co., 137 F. Supp. 197,
200 (D.N.J. 1955) (granting defendant’s motion for civil discovery of trial witness tran-
scripts because government already had access; “[l]ooking at the parties themselves, the
ends of justice would clearly call for a discovery of what plaintiff knows of this relevant
testimony, to defendant, in order that the parties may be placed on a parity”).
194. 239 F.2d 263 (7th Cir. 1956).
195. Id. at 265.
196. Id. at 265-67. The Treasury Department had begun an investigation into alleged
tax evasion. Id. at 265. The target “furnished to treasury agents its records and suitable
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the Treasury Department had originally requested—turned the
documents over to the agent assistants, and then recessed for a
week.197 The targets of the investigation petitioned the federal
district court to examine the grand jury minutes, question the
grand jurors concerning the conduct of the agents, and hold in
contempt any Treasury agents that had perused grand jury ma-
terials outside the scope of the grand jury investigation. The dis-
trict court dismissed the petition, and the targets appealed,
claiming that such misuse of grand jury powers violated their
Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights.198 The Seventh Circuit
agreed, holding that opening the envelope of grand jury secrecy to
government agents becomes a constitutional violation of Fourth
and Fifth Amendment protections the moment that the other-
wise-protected grand jury matters are used “in any manner for
the purposes” of a civil proceeding.199 Although the court would
not condone interference with the grand jury’s actions in making
                                                                                                             
accommodations for the agents at its offices, and expended about $20,000 in making the
services of its auditors available to said agents . . . .” Id. The target was indicted, tried, and
convicted, but the conviction was reversed because of the admission of illegal evidence. Id.
The Treasury Department then began a new investigation. Id. Again, the target provided
all information requested (approximately a van load). Id. at 265-66. When the Treasury
Department issued more subpoenas that sought much of the information reviewed during
the first investigation, the target challenged them as unreasonable harassment, an unrea-
sonable search and seizure, and a denial of due process of law. Id. at 266. While the Treas-
ury Department did not attempt to enforce the subpoenas, it did recommend that the De-
partment of Justice begin a grand jury investigation. Id. The Department of Justice then
appointed two Treasury Department agents as special assistants to conduct a grand jury
investigation. Id. at 266-67.
197. Id. at 267.
198. Id. at 268.
199. Id. at 271-73:
If . . . efforts are directed toward the procuring of evidence for civil proceedings
now or hereafter pending against petitioners, and that purpose is accom-
plished, then the secrecy of the grand jury has been breached. We find nothing
in the history of the grand jury to justify the perversion of its functions or ma-
chinery by third persons for the purposes of a civil proceeding. The Fifth
Amendment’s adoption of the grand jury for use in the United States was for
the historic purpose of initiating prosecutions for serious crimes. With the
grand jury came its time-honored policy of secrecy. The idea that information
obtained from the perusal of material in the possession of a grand jury may be
used for the purpose of a civil proceeding is in direct conflict with the policy of
secrecy of grand jury proceedings.
. . . The application of secrecy to [the grand jury’s] proceedings is a safeguard
for the grand jury itself, because it tends to prevent it from being used as an
instrument for explorations in aid of civil proceedings. . . .
. . . .
. . . [W]e think it is now apparent that, as far as civil proceedings are con-
cerned, the production of these records and documents pursuant to a grand
jury subpoena, if followed by their use in any manner for the purposes of such a
civil proceeding against petitioners, violates their constitutional rights under . .
. provisions of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
32 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:1
the disclosures to the Treasury Department, it did determine that
the targets of the investigation could invoke the court’s supervi-
sory powers to protect their constitutional rights.200
On the other hand, in In re Petroleum Industry Investig a-
tion,201 a Virginia federal district court adopted the policy urged
by the government. The court held that the government should be
able to use information gained by grand jury criminal process for
civil litigation.202 The court also found that the absence of other
means of gathering the evidence was irrelevant to the court’s de-
termination of whether to allow penetration of the grand jury.203
The D.C. Circuit articulated a third approach to the secrecy is-
sue in Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass’n v. United
States.204 The court adopted a well-balanced solution: it allowed
government attorneys to retain and use grand jury materials for
subsequent civil proceedings, but only to the extent that those
materials would have been discoverable through civil discovery
devices.205 The precise procedure outlined by the court placed the
onus on the government to give the defendants notice of its in-
tention to use grand jury materials sixty days before the civil pro-
ceeding occurred.206 Thus, the procedure provided defendants the
                                                                                                             
200. Id. at 272.
201. 152 F. Supp. 646, 647 (E.D. Va. 1957).
202. Id.:
[I]f books and papers coming to the knowledge of the Government’s attorneys
in a grand jury investigation develop a demand, and an adequacy of proof, for
resort to civil litigation in the public interest, it is certainly proper, indeed in-
cumbent upon them, to use for that purpose the information in their hands.
Accord United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 14 F.R.D. 230, 233 (D.N.J. 1953) (finding
no authority for Procter & Gamble’s contention that civil use of grand jury process was il-
legal and refusing to accept the Procter & Gamble contention as the rule).
203. In re Petroleum Indus. Investigation, 152 F. Supp. at 647. “This is nonetheless
true though no process available in a civil action has the competency to discover this data
beforehand.” Id.
204. 250 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1957). For the district court’s analysis proposing the ap-
proach taken in the circuit court, see Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass’n v. United
States, 151 F. Supp. 438, 440 (D.D.C. 1956). Judge Holtzoff, the author of the district court
opinion, was Secretary to the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure. See also supra notes 155, 157.
205. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass’n, 250 F.2d at 425-26.
206. Id.
[T]he United States may use in the trial of any future civil action against the
Association only such of the [grand jury] documents, of which it has retained
copies, as it could obtain through discovery processes available to civil actions
and only such as are enumerated by it as those upon which it will or possibly
may rely . . . .
Id. at 426.
This approach is infinitely more equitable than granting automatic disclosure because
the defendant will at least have an opportunity to challenge the disclosure before it occurs.
“The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard. . . . The
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same opportunity to challenge the requested disclosure that they
would have if the government had utilized civil investigatory de-
vices.207 This procedure fairly weighed the government’s interest in
civil law enforcement against the interest in protecting individuals
from the abusive use of grand jury powers for civil discovery.
In its one-page panel order,208 the D.C. Circuit provided the
linchpin for a fair grand jury process. Although few courts have
adopted the language and wisdom of Maryland & Virginia Milk
Producers Ass’n ,209 its importance to grand jury jurisprudence
cannot be overemphasized. The order provided an equitable solu-
tion to problematic discovery issues in parallel proceedings. Thus,
the court’s analysis should profoundly affect the next revisitation
of this issue by the Supreme Court’s and any lower courts.
Having no guidance from the Supreme Court on this problem-
atic and perplexing issue, however, courts often lifted the veil of
grand jury secrecy for civil use in the decade following promulga-
tion of Rule 6(e) by applying a standard that questioned whether
“the ends of justice” demanded such disclosure.210 The govern-
ment often sought and received disclosure of grand jury materials
for preparation of civil cases; consequently, civil defendants often
requested reciprocal disclosure to prepare a defense. Many of the
decisions granting civil defendants reciprocal access to grand jury
materials in the 1940s and 1950s expressed concern for funda-
                                                                                                             
hearing must be ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 267 nn.11-12 (1970) (citations omitted).
207. See generally infra notes 264-67 (explaining that civil agency subpoenas may be
challenged prior to compliance and appealed).
208. The order in its entirety is contained in the Appendix to this Article. See also
Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass’n, 151 F. Supp. at 438 (underlying district court
opinion).
209. Two district court cases adopted the approach taken in Maryland & Virginia Milk
Producers Ass’n. See United States v. General Elec. Co., 211 F. Supp. 641, 643 (E.D. Pa.
1962); United States v. Moore, 423 F. Supp. 858, 859 (S.D. W. Va. 1976).
210. Because the courts had no guidance on the emerging civil use of grand jury materi-
als, they borrowed heavily from the criminal context. The “ends of justice” standard came
from United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 233-34 (1940), a criminal case in
which the Supreme Court stated: “Grand jury testimony is ordinarily confidential. . . . [b]ut
after the grand jury’s functions are ended, disclosure is wholly proper where the ends of jus-
tice require it.” Id. at 233-34 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Ben Grunstein &
Sons Co., 137 F. Supp. 197, 200 (D.N.J. 1955) (reviewing a False Claims Act case in which
“the ends of justice would clearly call for a discovery of what plaintiff knows of this relevant
[trial witness] testimony, to defendant, in order that the parties may be placed on a parity”);
Herman Schwabe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 194 F. Supp. 763, 765 (D. Mass. 1958)
(granting Sherman Act defendant’s civil subpoena duces tecum served on Attorney General to
produce plaintiff’s ten-year-old grand jury testimony against defendant in original criminal
investigation and concluding that “no evidence which is calculated to do justice should be
suppressed by either side”); In re Special 1952 Grand Jury, 22 F.R.D. 102, 108 (E.D. Pa. 1958)
(“[A]s a matter of justice the defendant has a right to discovery of testimony necessary to en-
able it to prepare its defense.”).
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mental fairness of process and parity between the parties.211 But
these decisions were inconsistent, confusing, and provided no
clear guidance to government counsel or defendants. The Su-
preme Court was slow to address this critical aspect of Rule 6(e).
VI.   PROCTER & GAMBLE: A MISSED OPPORTUNITY212
In 1956, twelve years after promulgation of Rule 6(e), the Su-
preme Court first addressed the civil use of grand jury materials
in United States v. Procter & Gamble Co. 213 Procter & Gamble
was a classic “big case”214 under the Sherman Antitrust Act.215
Like all “big cases,” this case involved possible criminal and civil
liabilities216 and engendered both criminal and civil investiga-
tions. The clash between the civil and criminal rules of procedure
and the need for a definitive ruling on the use of grand jury ma-
terials in civil litigation compelled the Supreme Court to grant
certiorari.
Procter & Gamble  began with an eighteen-month-long grand
jury investigation into possible criminal violations of the Anti-
trust Act by the corporation.217 The grand jury’s term expired
without an indictment.218 The United States then filed a civil en-
forcement action under section 4 of the Sherman Act.219 Thereaf-
ter, the government sought and received from the district court a
civil discovery order compelling Procter & Gamble to produce ap-
proximately 800 documents.220 These same documents had been
subpoenaed by the grand jury.221 The government’s civil discovery
motion, in fact, identified the documents by the very exhibit
                                                                                                             
211. See sources cited supra note 210.
212. The Supreme Court’s first opportunity to address the government’s use of grand
jury materials for civil actions failed to even consider the balanced approach presented by
Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass’n. Although the precise issue was not on appeal,
the Court did address it in dictum and left the lower courts as confused as before. See infra
notes 244-48 and accompanying text.
213. 356 U.S. 677 (1958).
214. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 19 F.R.D. 122, 128-29 (D.N.J. 1956); see
also Breck P. McAllister, The Big Case: Procedural Problems in Antitrust Litigation, 64
HARV. L. REV. 27 (1950).
215. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994). The case began as a civil action under § 4 of the Act, with
the prosecution alleging criminal conspiracies in violation of §§ 1 and 2 as the basis for the
claim. Procter & Gamble, 19 F.R.D. at 123 n.1.
216. Procter & Gamble, 19 F.R.D. at 130.
217. Id. at 123.
218. Id. In fact, the grand jury was never asked to return an indictment. United States
v. Procter & Gamble Co., 187 F. Supp. 55, 57 (D.N.J. 1960).
219. See Procter & Gamble, 19 F.R.D. at 123 n.1.
220. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 14 F.R.D. 230, 233 (D.N.J. 1953).
221. Id.
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numbers placed upon them when they were produced for the
grand jury.222 Procter & Gamble produced the documents and then,
to prepare for trial, moved for disclosure of the entire grand jury
transcript under Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.223
Procter & Gamble claimed that the ends of justice required
reciprocal access because the United States had used and would
continue to use grand jury materials in its civil enforcement ac-
tion.224 The Department of Justice, arguing against reciprocal
disclosure, admitted that the grand jury had been convened to in-
vestigate both criminal and civil violations of the Sherman Act,225
and claimed a right and a duty to use grand jury materials for the
preparation of related governmental civil actions.226 The district
court, while acknowledging that the government’s use of grand
jury materials in the civil case was not at issue,227 took the gov-
ernment’s nonreciprocal use of grand jury material into consid-
eration to determine whether disclosure of the entire transcript to
Procter & Gamble was warranted.
 Aligning itself with earlier decisions that focused on the “ends
of justice” standard in granting reciprocal access,228 the district
court ordered disclosure of the requested grand jury minutes to
establish parity in trial preparation.229 While the government’s
prior and continuing nonreciprocal use of grand jury transcripts
was “perhaps sufficient” in and of itself to justify granting the de-
fendant’s discovery request,230 the discovery benefit in this case,
                                                                                                             
222. Id.
223. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 1955 Trade Cases (CCH) ¶ 68,228 (D.N.J.
1955); see also Procter & Gamble, 19 F.R.D. at 123. The then-current version of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 34 provided in part:
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor and upon notice to all
other parties, and subject to the provisions of Rule 30(b), the court in which an
action is pending may (1) order any party to produce and permit the inspection
and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any des-
ignated documents . . . not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence re-
lating to any of the matters within the scope of the examination permitted by
Rule 26(b) and which are in his possession, custody, or control . . . .
Fed. R. Civ. P. 34 (1957).
224. Procter & Gamble, 19 F.R.D. at 124-25.
225. Id. at 125.
226. Id. at 124.
227. Id. at 124-25.
228. See sources cited supra note 210. Although recognizing the need for equity in civil
discovery, the court failed to recognize the simple method for achieving that equity pre-
sented in Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass’n. See supra text accompanying notes
204-09; see also discussion infra part XIII.
229. Procter & Gamble, 19 F.R.D. at 128.
230. Id. at 125. Although not cited in the district court opinion, the “ends of justice”
rationale had already been put forward in a criminal context by the Supreme Court:
“Grand jury testimony is ordinarily confidential. . . . But after the grand jury’s functions
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where the government had not even identified the issues for
trial,231 was of primary importance to the court’s decision to lift
the grand jury veil of secrecy.232
The government appealed to the Supreme Court on one issue:
whether a private defendant could gain access to grand jury tran-
scripts under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34.233 The Supreme
Court, like the district court, weighed the fair trial objectives of
civil discovery against the “long established policy that maintains
the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings . . . .”234 The Court,
while acknowledging that the United States was subject to the
rules of civil discovery,235 determined that Procter & Gamble had
not met the “good cause” requirement of Rule 34.236 The Court
concluded that the “good cause” necessary to justify grand jury
disclosure required a showing of “compelling necessity” without
which “a defense would be greatly prejudiced or that without ref-
erence to it an injustice would be done.”237 The Court also noted
that this necessity “must be shown with particularity,”238 thus es-
tablishing a “particularized need” standard for disclosure. Apply-
ing the criteria, the Court held that Procter & Gamble would not
be prejudiced merely because use of ordinary civil discovery rules
would involve delay and substantial costs.239
                                                                                                             
are ended, disclosure is wholly proper where the ends of justice require it.” United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 233-34 (1940) (citations omitted).
231. See Procter & Gamble, 19 F.R.D. at 133.
232. Id. at 128:
The court concludes that since plaintiff is using the transcripts containing
relevant information, the ends of justice require the court to order plaintiff to
produce and permit the inspection and copying by defendants of the tran-
scripts; equal use of the transcripts by defendants will give them the fullest
possible knowledge of the facts before trial; none of the reasons for the rule of
secrecy applies.
233. See United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 434 n.19 (1983) (“The Court
[in Procter & Gamble] did not address . . . the conditions under which . . . civil use by the
Government could be permitted, since the issue in the case was only whether private par-
ties could obtain access [to grand jury materials].”).
234. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681 (1958) (citations omitted).
235. Id.
236. Id.; see also United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 1955 Trade Cases (CCH) ¶
68,228 (D.N.J. 1955); Procter & Gamble, 19 F.R.D. at 123.
237. Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. at 682.
238. Id. In Douglas Oil Co. of California v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211
(1979), the Supreme Court revisited this standard in a purely civil case. The Court clari-
fied the standard that was required for particularized necessity: “Parties . . . must show
that the material they seek is needed to avoid a possible injustice in another judicial pro-
ceeding, that the need for disclosure is greater than the need for continued secrecy, and
that their request is structured to cover only material so needed.” Id. at 222 (citation omit-
ted).
239. Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. at 682.
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While the government’s use of grand jury transcripts was not
directly at issue in the appeal, the Court, recognizing that the
district court’s decision rested heavily upon that question, noted
in dictum that there had been no finding of fact that the govern-
ment had used the grand jury process solely to elicit evidence for
the civil proceeding.240 The Court also noted, however, that “[i]f
the prosecution were using that device, it would be flouting the
policy of the law,”241 and “wholesale discovery” to the defendant
would then be an appropriate remedy.242 Nevertheless, the Court
did not find that the government’s mere use of grand jury mate-
rials in Procter & Gamble  presented the same concerns;243 and, in
the final analysis, the case failed to address the real issue of
grand jury secrecy.
The holding of Procter & Gamble  placed a heavy burden upon
civil defendants seeking to gain access to grand jury materials:
they either must show particularized need for the material or
must prove that the prosecutor subverted the grand jury process.
Moreover, the majority provided no standard for assessing either
government subversion or the need for access to grand jury ma-
terials. Procter & Gamble  created a substantial imbalance in civil
discovery and left the lower courts in the same state of confusion
as before.
Agreeing with the majority that there was no finding by the
district court that the government had used the grand jury in-
vestigation for a civil purpose, Justice Whittaker, in a concurring
opinion, recognized that the Department of Justice probably im-
paneled grand juries for precisely that purpose in similar cases.244
Condoning this breach of the secrecy rule would, in his opinion,
encourage government attorneys to abuse the grand jury proc-
ess.245 Therefore, he concluded that fundamental fairness and
concerns of grand jury abuse justified requiring government at-
torneys to show the same particularized need for access to grand
jury materials as any private litigant.246
                                                                                                             
240. Id. at 683.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 684: “It is only when the criminal procedure is subverted that ‘good cause’
for wholesale discovery and production of a grand jury transcript would be warranted.”
243. Id. Without any discussion of grand jury secrecy or a standard to justify disclo-
sure, the Court stated: “The fact that a criminal case failed does not mean that the evi-
dence obtained could not be used in a civil case.” Id.
244. Id. at 684 (Whittaker, J., concurring).
245. Id. at 685.
246. In order to maintain the secrecy of grand jury proceedings; to eliminate the
temptation to conduct grand jury investigations as a means of ex parte procure-
ment of direct or derivative evidence for use in a contemplated civil suit; and to
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The Procter & Gamble  Court missed the opportunity to di-
rectly address the critical secrecy issue. The decision foreclosed
trial courts from granting reciprocal disclosure to defendants for
the purpose of insuring parity in discovery. Consequently, the fo-
cus of grand jury disclosure litigation inevitably shifted to the
propriety of governmental breaches of the secrecy rule.
Immediately after the Supreme Court’s decision, the parties
resumed battle in the district court. Procter & Gamble attempted
to establish a “finding of fact” that grand jury abuse had oc-
curred.247 For the next two years, the trial court rendered deci-
sions that interpreted and applied the Supreme Court’s guide-
lines to ever-expanding discovery issues.248 The trial court first
determined that proof of subversion of the grand jury process at
some point during the grand jury proceeding only warranted dis-
covery of the minutes transcribed after that time.249 The point at
which the subversion occurred identified the breach of grand jury
secrecy; therefore,
[t]he critical question . . . is, when this case first became only
“a civil case.” From that time on, our highest court has said
that using the Grand Jury to elicit evidence in that case would
flout the law, would subvert criminal procedure, would require
that any advantage thus obtained improperly by the Govern-
ment be wiped out, by giving the opposing party the use of so
much of the Grand Jury transcript as was thus obtained by a
criminal procedure in a purely civil case.250
The court further concluded that a defendant had the right to dis-
cover government information that would prove the point at
                                                                                                             
eliminate, so far as possible, fundamental unfairness and inequality by permit-
ting the Government’s attorneys, agents and investigators to possess and use
such materials while denying like possession and use by attorneys for the defen-
dants in such a case, I would adopt a rule requiring that the grand jury minutes
and transcripts and all copies thereof and memoranda made therefrom, in cases
where a “no true bill” has been voted, be promptly upon return sealed and im-
pounded with the clerk of the court, subject to inspection . . . only upon order of
the court . . . upon a showing of such exceptional and particularized need as is
necessary to establish “good cause” . . . under Rule 34.
Id.
247. See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 174 F. Supp. 233, 234 (D.N.J. 1959).
248. See id.; United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 175 F. Supp. 198 (D.N.J. 1959);
United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 180 F. Supp. 195 (D.N.J. 1959); United States v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 25 F.R.D. 485 (D.N.J. 1960); United States v. Procter & Gamble
Co., 187 F. Supp. 55 (D.N.J. 1960).
249. Procter & Gamble, 174 F. Supp. at 235.
250. Id. at 235-36.
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which subversion of the grand jury began,251 holding that no pre-
sumption of regularity252 or privilege253 would bar such discovery.
After discovery compliance by the government revealed evi-
dence of at least partial abuse of the grand jury proceeding, the
district court made a “finding of fact” that abuse had indeed oc-
curred.254 Procter & Gamble immediately moved to suppress or
impound all evidence gained through the breach of secrecy.255
Finding that the Supreme Court had indicated that reciprocal ac-
cess was the appropriate remedy, the court denied the motion.256
                                                                                                             
251. The court granted the defendant’s motion to compel discovery from Department of
Justice officials concerning the progression of their investigation and their determination
to pursue the case as a civil action, stating:
It is the lack of proof in this cause as to what such authoritative determina-
tion by the Government was, and when it was made, that made our highest
court in Procter & Gamble say that “there is no finding that the grand jury
proceeding was used as a short cut to goals otherwise barred or more difficult
to reach.” But that Court has also held that the use of “criminal procedures to
elicit evidence in a civil case . . . would be flouting the policy of the law,” and a
subversion of criminal procedure, and that this would call for “wholesale dis-
covery” by clear inference of all of the Grand Jury proceedings which were
taken after the Government had determined not to proceed criminally. Thus it
now becomes necessary, in order to do justice, to determine when the Govern-
ment did finally determine to proceed against the present defendants solely by
the present civil complaint, as it obviously did at some time.
Id. at 240.
252. As for the Government’s objection that a presumption of regularity in the
conduct of governmental affairs should be deemed to exist, it should be noted,
first, that previous to the decision in Procter & Gamble, the Department of
Justice had regularly considered it the proper thing to do, when the occasion
arose, to use the Grand Jury to make even a solely civil case under the anti-
trust laws. Thus the question here is not whether the Government did the
regular thing in fact, but whether this regular thing which it did was in fact
lawful, in the light of the rule for the first time laid down by our highest court
in Procter & Gamble.
Id. at 237 (citation omitted).
253. [W]here the Executive Department of the Government has voluntarily
sought the aid of the Judicial Department of the Government to enforce the law
of the land, as here, and the United States Supreme Court has declared that
the law of the land requires a certain “finding,” in order to do justice between
the parties in that judicial proceeding, it would not seem that the Executive
Department could rely on a mere “housekeeping” privilege of its own, to refuse
to abide by the law of the land and give evidence as to such “finding.”
Id. at 238.
The executive privilege is discussed more fully in United States v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
25 F.R.D. 485 (D.N.J. 1960). As explained in that case, the issue was whether “an execu-
tive privilege exists to engage in full discussion and deliberation with subordinates as well
as Department heads without disclosing same, ‘in order to form a proper judgment’ as that
judgment affects not only the Government’s rights but those of opposing parties in the
course of litigation.” Id. at 489 (citation omitted).
254. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 175 F. Supp. 198, 199-200 (D.N.J. 1959).
255. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 180 F. Supp. 195, 200 (D.N.J. 1959).
256. In so doing, the court addressed the very real and unique problems faced by the
Department of Justice when pursuing cases that involve both criminal and civil liabilities.
The court noted that the Sherman Antitrust Act is primarily a criminal statute. See Proc-
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Therefore, the court granted Procter & Gamble disclosure of
grand jury testimony to the extent it had proven grand jury
abuse.257 To do otherwise, the court reasoned, would “put an end
to the Government’s case” and make it impossible for the De-
partment of Justice to enforce antitrust laws.258
Dissatisfied with this decision, Procter & Gamble set out to
prove that the government had subverted the entire grand jury
proceeding. Through civil discovery, it obtained proof that the
Department of Justice had convened the grand jury knowing an
indictment was improbable; in fact, the government had always
planned to seek a civil remedy.259 Faced with this clear evidence,
the district court granted full disclosure of grand jury transcripts
to Procter & Gamble.260 Nine years of litigation finally ended with
proof of grand jury secrecy abuse that required reciprocal access
in the name of fairness.
The potential for abuse of grand jury secrecy, while not the fo-
cal point of the Supreme Court’s decision in Procter & Gamble , at
least established such abuse as a critical concern in the context of
such epic civil antitrust litigation. However, given the example of
Procter & Gamble , the administration of justice would be better
served by the equitable approach adopted in Maryland & Vir-
ginia Milk Producers Ass’n .261 This approach would serve the
needs of civil law enforcement yet still protect the due process
rights of the individual by discouraging grand jury abuse.
                                                                                                             
ter & Gamble, 180 F. Supp. at 203. Section 4 of the Act also provides a civil equitable rem-
edy for the same conduct, however. 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1994). Thus, an investigation would cer-
tainly involve conduct that could be construed as either criminal or civil. The choice of
remedy is left in the discretion of the prosecutor. The critical question becomes the timing
of that choice. To use the criminal grand jury process solely to develop a civil case is, ac-
cording to the Supreme Court, to flout the policy of law. United States v. Procter & Gam-
ble, 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958).
257. Procter & Gamble, 180 F. Supp. at 206-07.
258. Id. at 200. While the district court recognized the unique difficulties involved in
investigating civil antitrust violations, it failed to recognize that a solution existed that
would allow for governmental use of grand jury materials while still protecting the rights
of the individual. If the court had applied the rationale of Maryland & Virginia Milk Pro-
ducers Ass’n, this nine-year battle could have been avoided.
259. Procter & Gamble obtained numerous internal Department of Justice memo-
randa, many of which noted that the original intent of the investigation against Procter &
Gamble was to file a civil suit. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 187 F. Supp. 55, 59-
60 (D.N.J. 1960).
260. Id. at 58.
261. See supra notes 204-09 and accompanying text; see also discussion infra part XIII.
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VII.   EMERGING CONCERNS OVER ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY
ACCESS TO GRAND JURY MATERIALS
Issues pertaining to the propriety of the Department of Jus-
tice’s use of grand jury materials for civil litigation were not the
only concerns arising from the 1946 codification of Rule 6(e). A
similar question about administrative agency access to grand jury
materials quickly surfaced.262 The investigative powers of federal
administrative agencies are more limited than those which a
grand jury may employ in criminal investigations,263 and agency
actions are statutorily subject to judicial review.264 Although cer-
tain federal statutes grant administrative agencies subpoena
powers when they are necessary to carry out the agencies’ inves-
tigative and adjudicatory functions,265 gathering information in
this manner often proves more costly and frustrating than obtain-
ing the materials from the grand jury.266 Thus, administrative
agencies, like the Department of Justice’s own civil attorneys,
have attempted to seek information from a particular grand jury
to circumvent their more restrictive investigation scheme. This
has resulted in Rule 6(e) disclosure litigation.267
The Advisory Committee was aware of the agencies’ role in
law enforcement while drafting the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.268 Indeed, Congress enacted the Administrative Proce-
                                                                                                             
262. See sources cited supra notes 178-80.
263. For a comprehensive overview of administrative agency powers of investigation, see
generally KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (2d ed. 1978). For a more de-
tailed look at the enforcement programs of selected federal agencies, see NEIL A. KAPLAN ET
AL., PARALLEL GRAND JURY AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY INVESTIGATIONS 27-59 (1981).
264. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994); see also Urban A. Lav-
ery, The Administrative Process: Factual Analysis of the Report of Attorney General’s
Committee on Administrative Procedure, 1 F.R.D. 651, 672-73 (1940):
In the whole field of Administrative Law, the functions that can be performed
by judicial review are fairly limited. Its objective, broadly speaking, is to serve
as a check on the administrative branch of the government. Judicial review is
rarely available, theoretically or practically, to compel effective enforcement of
the law by administrators. It is adapted chiefly to curbing excess of power, not
toward compelling its exercise.
265. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1994) (granting subpoena powers to Federal Trade
Commission); 15 U.S.C. § 78(u) (1994) (granting subpoena powers to the Securities and
Exchange Commission); 26 U.S.C. §§ 7602, 7609 (1994) (granting subpoena powers to In-
ternal Revenue Service); 47 U.S.C. § 409(e) (1994) (granting subpoena powers to Federal
Communication Commission).
266. See, e.g., Petition for Certiorari at 12a, United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S.
418 (1983) (No. 81-1032) (“In fact, frustration over limitations on civil discovery may have
prompted the government to convene the grand jury here.”).
Agency subpoenas must be enforced in federal district court and an enforcement order
may be appealed. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7604 (1994).
267. See e.g., In re April 1956 Term Grand Jury, 239 F.2d 263, 271 (7th Cir. 1956).
268. In 1939, Congress appointed a committee to investigate administrative proce-
dures and to suggest improvements. The result of the committee’s work was the Federal
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dure Act concurrently with the completion of the Rules.269 Con-
gress created the Act to establish uniform procedures for all fed-
eral agencies and to serve as a “check upon administrators whose
zeal might otherwise have carried them to excesses not contem-
plated in legislation creating their offices.”270 Additionally, the
Advisory Committee was asked specifically to resolve the issue of
administrative agency access to grand jury materials.271 Unfortu-
nately, Rule 6(e), as finally adopted, did not do so. Thus, trial and
appellate court decisions concerning disclosure to federal agencies
were far from uniform.272
The first and leading appellate case dealing with the disclo-
sure of grand jury material to federal agencies was Doe v. Rosen-
berry,273 decided the same year as Procter & Gamble . In Rosen-
berry, a federal grand jury had been investigating a New York at-
torney’s alleged criminal activity.274 While the grand jury did not
return an indictment, it did refer information concerning the at-
torney’s activities to the New York Bar Association’s Grievance
Committee.275 The Committee then sought and obtained a court
order for disclosure of grand jury transcripts under Rule 6(e).276
The attorney challenged the order on the grounds the investiga-
tion was not conducted “preliminarily to . . . a judicial proceeding”
within the meaning of Rule 6(e).277 A court cannot grant an order
for disclosure, even where particularized need exists, if this
                                                                                                             
Administrative Procedure Act. The Chairman of the Advisory Committee on the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, Arthur T. Vanderbilt, also was a member of the Attorney
General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure. Compare Attorney General’s Committee
on Administrative Procedure, 1 F.R.D. 259 (1941) (appointing Arthur T. Vanderbilt as
member), with 7 WILKEN & TRIFFIN, supra note 155, at xi-xii (quoting Letter of Transmit-
tal submitted by Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Chairman, Advisory Committee on the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure (July 1944)). See also Urban A. Lavery, The Administrative
Process: Factual Analysis of the Report of Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative
Procedure, 1 F.R.D. 651 (1940) (listing all federal administrative agencies and federal de-
partments created before 1940 that were exercising administrative powers).
269. 5 U.S.C. § 1009(a) (1946) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994)); see also Ur-
ban A. Lavery, The Practicing Lawyer and the New Federal Administrative Procedure Act,
6 F.R.D. 51 (1946).
270. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 644 (1950).
271. See 3 WILKEN & TRIFFIN, supra note 178, at 352.
272. See generally David E. Brodsky & Nicholas M. De Feis, Note, Facilitating Admin-
istrative Agency Access to Grand Jury Material, 91 YALE L.J. 1614 (1982) (analyzing in-
consistent and contradictory decisions interpreting Rule 6(e) in context of federal agency
access to grand jury materials).
273. 255 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1958). See also Brodsky & De Feis, supra note 272, at 1627
n.49 (stating that Rosenberry was the first appellate decision concerning administrative
agency access to grand jury materials under Rule 6(e)).
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threshold criterion is not met.278 The decision in Rosenberry,
therefore, turned upon the meaning of “preliminarily to.”
In assessing whether disclosure was appropriate, the court
employed a two-prong test: first, whether any hearing before the
grievance committee was “preliminary to” any charges of unpro-
fessional conduct that might take the matter into court; and sec-
ond, whether any court proceeding was a “judicial proceeding”
under the Rule.279 The court defined a “judicial proceeding”
broadly to include “any proceeding determinable by a court, hav-
ing for its object the compliance of any person, subject to judicial
control, with standards imposed upon his conduct in the public
interest, even though such compliance is enforced without the
procedure applicable to the punishment of crime.”280 Finding that
the two-prong test had been met, the court upheld the disclosure
order281 but never addressed what standard of need was required
before disclosure would be allowed. The court posited a test that
balanced the public interest in maintaining the integrity of the
bar against the appellant’s interest in grand jury secrecy.282
Procter & Gamble , however, did set forth the standards of
need for private parties seeking disclosure.283 Whether those
same standards applied to federal agencies became the subject of
litigation. Initial decisions held that federal agency attorneys
were not allowed automatic access as “attorney[s] for the gov-
ernment” under Rule 6(e)284 and that the “particularized need”
standard set forth in Procter & Gamble  applied to federal agen-
cies seeking court-ordered disclosure.285 Some courts were not as
certain that they should interpret Rule 6(e) so narrowly, however,
especially where a U.S. Attorney sought a disclosure order to ac-
                                                                                                             
278. Id.
279. Id. at 120.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. See id.; see also In re Bullock, 103 F. Supp. 639 (D.D.C. 1952) (finding that public
interest in preserving integrity of police department outweighed interest in secrecy).
283. See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958). In 1979, the
Supreme Court revisited this question in Douglas Oil Co. of California v. Petrol Stops
Northwest, 441 U.S. 211 (1979), where it expanded the scope of this standard by creating a
three-part test a private litigant must meet to gain disclosure. Id. at 222.
284. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 309 F.2d 440, 443 (3rd Cir. 1962):
The term “attorneys for the government” is restrictive in its application and
does not include the attorneys for the administrative agencies. If it had been
intended that the attorneys for the administrative agencies were to have free
access to matters occurring before a grand jury, the rule would have so pro-
vided.
285. A federal agency “stands in no higher degree of privilege than a private litigant”
seeking access to grand jury materials. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 29 F.R.D. 151, 154
(E.D. Pa. 1961), aff’d, 309 F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 1962).
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quire assistance from a federal agency attorney on a criminal
case being investigated by a grand jury. One case in particular
that raised this issue and eventually prompted congressional ac-
tion was In re William H. Pflaumer & Sons, Inc. 286
 In Pflaumer, the federal district court was confronted with the
overlapping enforcement duties of the Internal Revenue Service’s
criminal and civil investigation divisions287 in a racketeering and
tax case against Pflaumer & Sons’ beer distributing company.288
Surveying the limited case law,289 Judge Becker found that courts
uniformly refused to condone automatic exceptions to grand jury
secrecy for the IRS, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Ten-
nessee Valley Authority.290 However, citing the Advisory Commit-
tee’s notes for Rules 6(e) and 54(c), the court found no guidance
on what the drafters meant by “attorneys for the government.”291
Judge Becker, therefore, decided to grant automatic disclosure to
government agency personnel under an “aegis” theory.292 The
                                                                                                             
286. 53 F.R.D. 464 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
287. “An intelligence division agent within the Internal Revenue Service is responsible
for criminal investigations: a separate kind of agent—a revenue agent—is responsible for
civil investigations.” Grand Jury Reform: Hearings on H.R. 94 Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law, House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 765 (1977) (statement of Benjamin R. Civiletti, Ass’t Att’y Gen., Crim.
Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice).
288. Pflaumer, 53 F.R.D. at 466.
289. Id. at 470.
290. Id. at 473-76.
291. Id. at 476 n.31. Judge Becker’s quotation from the Advisory Committee’s notes
used an ellipsis to stop short of the explanation for granting automatic disclosure to attor-
neys for the government “inasmuch as they may be present in the grand jury room during
the presentation of evidence.” FED R. CRIM. P 6(e) advisory committee’s note. Contrary to
Judge Becker’s conclusion, there is very little historical support for the assertion that De-
partment of Justice attorneys not directly involved in the grand jury presentation should
have automatic access to grand jury material.
292. Pflaumer, 53 F.R.D. at 476. The “aegis” theory was developed under the district
court’s supervisory power to oversee who was having a look at grand jury materials, when,
and for how long. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 34-37 (1977) (statement of Hon. Edward R. Becker, U.S. District Judge,
Eastern District of Pennsylvania) [hereinafter Becker Statement]. The acting prosecutor
guiding the grand jury proceeding was charged with ensuring that materials disclosed for
the criminal case were not leaked or otherwise made available to parties outside of the po-
tential prosecution. Id.
In practice when a citizen turns over his cartons of papers to the grand jury
they will be examined by the government personnel assisting the attorneys for
the government in the offices of their own agency. We must remember, in that
context, that access to these records was made possible because they were sub-
poenaed to a secret grand jury. We must also note that grand jury material will
often be examined pursuant to Rule 6(e) by government and administrative
agencies, and yet: (1) the powers of federal administrative agencies are tightly
circumscribed by the statutes creating them; (2) federal agencies (including
IRS) are not permitted to launch general investigations which do not concen-
trate on a specific target; (3) agency subpoenas are subjected to greater scru-
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disclosure, however, was automatic only for use in the criminal
case before the grand jury.293 In expanding the terms of Rule 6(e),
Judge Becker suggested that the rule needed clarification.294
Apart from Judge Becker’s recommendation, there was no appar-
ent urgency behind the resulting proposal to amend the Rule,295
particularly in light of the work that had already begun on ple-
nary grand jury reform legislation.296
VIII.   CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
A.   The 1977 Amendment
The Advisory Committee prepared five amendments297 to the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in late 1972.298 However, the
                                                                                                             
tiny than grand jury subpoenas; (4) the agencies are not usually subject to the
direct supervision of the courts; and (5) their activities, unlike those of the
United States Attorney in connection with a given prosecution, are ongoing, so
that vindication at trial does not serve as a meaningful protection in cases of
abuse.
Congress has thus determined not to give administrative agencies powers
comparable to the grand jury. Yet the danger exists that the execution may ac-
cede to the grand jury’s extraordinary powers via Rule 6(e).
Id. at 49-50.
293. See Pflaumer, 53 F.R.D. at 475.
294. Id. at 468. Judge Becker made the specific suggestion to reevaluate and clarify
the phrase “attorneys for the government” to resolve “how far the ‘Attorney for the gov-
ernment’ exception to the secrecy principle may extend in view of the myriad situations in
which the United States Attorney works with and through other government agencies in
developing factual material for civil and criminal actions.” Id. He personally suggested
clarification to Judge Maris, with whom he worked in the U.S. Courthouse in Philadelphia,
and who was then chairman of the Supreme Court Rules Committee. Becker Statement,
supra note 292, at 28. One day, Judge Becker said to Judge Maris, “I wrote this [Pflaumer]
opinion, and [R]ule 6(e) ought to be clarified.” Id. Judge Becker testified that Judge Maris
replied, “Send it to me.” Id.
295. Such was the case even six years later: “[P]articularly since there has been no
demonstration or suggestion of any apparent urgency for the proposed amendment, the
subject of disclosure of grand jury proceedings and grand jury secrecy should be considered
as a whole together with the other legislation.” Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 150-51 (1977) (statement of Bernard J.
Nussbaum, Esq., Chicago) [hereinafter Nussbaum Statement].
296. “The questions concerning grand jury secrecy presented by the proposed substan-
tive change are basic to the function and operation of the grand jury. . . . The issues sur-
rounding Rule 6(e) and the proposed substantive change will be taken up by [the Sub-
committee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law] during its work on the
grand jury reform legislation.” H.R. REP. NO. 195, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977), reprinted
in Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
275 (1977) (Appendix 6).
297. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Hearings Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1 (1977).
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amendment proposing to clarify the first sentence of Rule 6(e)299
was not reported to Congress until April 26, 1976.300 It was soon
                                                                                                             
298. Id. at 84 (statement of Prof. Wayne LaFave, University of Illinois, reporter to the
Advisory Committee) [hereinafter LaFave Statement].
299. The 1976 proposal to amend Rule 6(e) stated:
(e) SECRECY OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISCLOSURE.—Disclosure of mat-
ters occurring before the grand jury other than its deliberations and the vote of
any juror may be made to the attorneys for the government for use in the per-
formance of their duties. For purposes of this subdivision, “attorneys for the
government” includes those enumerated in Rule 54(c); it also includes such
other government personnel as are necessary to assist the attorneys for the
government in the performance of their duties. Otherwise a juror, attorney, in-
terpreter, stenographer, operator of a recording device, or any typist who tran-
scribes recorded testimony may disclose matters occurring before the grand
jury only when so directed by the court preliminarily to or in connection with a
judicial proceeding or when permitted by the court at the request of the defen-
dant upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indict-
ment because of matters occurring before the grand jury. No obligation of secrecy
may be imposed upon any person, except in accordance with this rule . . . .
SUBCOMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 95TH CONG., 1ST
SESS., AMENDMENTS, FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 7 (Comm. Print 1977) (new
language underlined).
300. H.R. REP. NO. 195, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977) reprinted in Proposed Amend-
ments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 272 (1977)
(Appendix 6). 
There are at least three explanations for the four-year drafting period. First, the pro-
posals were first printed in the federal reporters during the summer of 1973 while 5,000
copies of the proposed amendments were circulated to the bench and bar for comments to
be received back by February 1974. Those comments led to revisions. LaFave Statement,
supra note 298, at 84. Second, Congress was involved with the Federal Rules of Evidence
and during that period did not consider the amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Becker Statement, supra note 292, at 46. Third, the Nixon administration’s
abuse of the grand jury process to harass its political opponents triggered a series of grand
jury reform proposals that overlapped the grand jury provisions of Federal Rule of Crimi-
nal Procedure 6. In his June 10, 1976, opening remarks to the first ever congressional
hearings on grand jury reform, Joshua Eilberg said,
In recent years . . . increasing evidence has been presented that the historic
function of the grand jury has been perverted and that its historic purpose has
been disregarded.
It has been almost 3 years since this subcommittee began its study of alleged
abuses in the Federal grand jury system.
In March of 1973, we received testimony regarding the so-called Fort Worth
Five controversy and listened to witnesses describe the use of grand juries to
investigate “political crimes”; the locating of grand jury inquiries, often for po-
litical purposes, far from the site of an alleged offense; the use of grants of im-
munity to elicit testimony; and the use of the court’s contempt power to coerce
it.
Federal Grand Jury: Hearings on H.J. Res. 46, H.R. 1277 and Related Bills Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2 (1976) (statement of Hon. Joshua Eilberg, Chairman of
the Subcommittee). See also generally Reform of the Grand Jury System: Hearings on S.
3274, H.R. 1277, H.R. 6006, H.R. 6207, H.R. 10947, H.R. 11660, H.R. 11870, H.R. 14146,
and H.J. 46 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Ju-
diciary, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1976); Grand Jury Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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afterwards that the Advisory Committee began deliberations to
clarify the Rule 6(e) grand jury secrecy exceptions that had
caused confusion and that were addressed by the proposed
amendment. The primary focus was whether automatic disclo-
sure of grand jury materials could be made to federal agency per-
sonnel in furtherance of the grand jury proceeding. If adopted as
proposed in 1976, the Rule, it was argued, could have expanded
the automatic exception to grand jury secrecy to include any em-
ployee within the federal government.301 According to Acting
Deputy Attorney General Richard Thornburgh, grand jury inves-
tigations were a team effort that required limited secrecy
breaches.302 It was common practice for agency lawyers to be ap-
pointed as Assistant U.S. Attorneys303 and expert witnesses, to
explain evidence to the grand jury.304 To the Department of Jus-
tice, the 1976 proposal was simply intended to make all the grand
jury evidence available to every legitimate member of the team;305
thus, the executive and judicial branches did not view Rule 6(e)
as foreclosing unauthorized and automatic disclosure of grand
jury material to agents of the government at the sole discretion of
the prosecuting attorney conducting the grand jury investiga-
tion.306
Nonreciprocal disclosure of grand jury materials to govern-
ment agents would have created an unacceptable imbalance be-
tween the government and defendants in subsequent civil regula-
                                                                                                             
301. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Hearings Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 19-20 (1977) (statement of Terry Philip Segal, Boston attorney and former Assis-
tant U.S. Attorney for Massachusetts and the District of Columbia).
302. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Hearings Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 66-67 (1977) (testimony of Richard L. Thornburgh) [hereinafter Thornburgh
Statement]. See also Nussbaum Statement, supra note 295, at 149 (“No one is left out, not
even Members of Congress or the military.”).
303. See generally Annotation, Propriety of Appointing an Attorney for a Federal
Agency as Special Assistant U.S. Attorney for Grand Jury Proceedings in Which the Agency
Is Interested, 58 A.L.R. FED. 696 (1982).
304. See In re William H. Pflaumer & Sons, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 464, 475-76 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
305. Thornburgh Statement, supra note 302, at 66-67.
306. See, e.g., Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of IRS, 406 F. Supp. 1098, 1120 n.38
(E.D. Pa. 1976) (granting Rule 6(e) disclosure but expressing doubts that court order was
required for IRS agent access to books, records, and transcripts presented before grand
jury). In at least one other jurisdiction, automatic disclosure seemed appropriate without
court supervision even after the potential misuse of grand jury material was challenged.
See Pflaumer, 53 F.R.D. at 473. In In re Kelly, 19 F.R.D. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), a federal
prosecutor represented to the court that only his staff, the FBI, and the IRS would exam-
ine union records acquired through a grand jury subpoena duces tecum. Id. at 270. Such
cases are rare, possibly because the issue of automatic disclosure only arises for review
when a grand jury target files a motion for a protective order—as Kelly did. See id.
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tory proceedings.307 The 1976 proposal attracted substantial
criticism.308 It was, however, apparent that Rule 6(e) needed con-
gressional attention.309
The well-documented abuses of the grand jury process by the
executive branch under President Nixon made the legislative
branch skeptical of the judicial branch and unlikely to rubber
stamp judicial promulgations of new grand jury rules.310 Conse-
                                                                                                             
307. “[T]here is a significant imbalance in favor of the government attorneys in prepa-
ration for trial of a criminal antitrust case, and the proposed amendment would increase
that imbalance.” Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Procedure: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 79 (1977) (statement of John F. McClatchey, Member of the Ohio Bar).
The American Bar Association requested that Congress make an explicit statement “to
insure that the grand jury information disseminated to [government] experts is not used in
violation of any constitutional rights, in unrelated criminal cases, or in any civil proceed-
ings.” Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Procedure: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 111
(1977) (statement of David Epstein, A.B.A. Crim. Just. Section).
308. “It is past history at this point that the Supreme Court proposal attracted sub-
stantial criticism, which seemed to stem more from the lack of precision in defining, and
consequent confusion and uncertainty concerning, the intended scope of the proposed
change than from a fundamental disagreement with the objective.” S. REP NO. 354, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 527, 529 (citing hearings that
took place in the House of Representatives on February 23 and 24, and March 2, 1977).
309. As pointed out during the House Subcommittee hearings, “at least one bill intro-
duced during the 94th Congress expressly recognized the necessary and appropriate primacy
of the legislative—not the rulemaking—function in this important policy area.” Nussbaum
Statement, supra note 295, at 150 (citing H.R. 6207, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975)).
310. On Tuesday, September 25, 1976, the Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights opened hearings on grand jury reform:
This morning’s hearing marks the first time the U.S. Senate has examined the
grand jury system since the grand jury’s inclusion in the Bill of Rights some
185 years ago. This long-overdue examination is a logical extension of the
hearings on “The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice” that this author conducted this summer.
Continuing revelation of Government lawlessness has led to a breakdown in
public trust in the integrity of our institutions. The Federal grand jury has not
escaped this skepticism.
. . . .
. . . [C]onfronted by instance after instance of grand jury abuse, the courts
have repeatedly failed to exercise their supervisory responsibilities over the
grand jury process.
Reform of the Grand Jury System: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights,
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2 (1976) (opening statement of Sen.
John V. Tunney). The hearing began consideration of four omnibus grand jury reform bills
introduced in the House, four House bills with grand jury reform provisions, and a Senate
bill to reform the grand jury. Id. at 1.
Introducing the Senate Grand Jury Reform Bill, Senator Abourezk stated that “the
Nixon administration used the grand jury as a tool of political repression in its effort to
silence the anti-war movement.” Reform of the Grand Jury System, Hearing before the
Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess.
4 (1976) (statement of Sen. James Abourezk). See also Federal Grand Jury: Hearings be-
fore the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law, House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 730-35 (1976) (providing synopses of selected cases
alleged to have been examples of grand jury abuse, including the Leslie Bacon case, the
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quently, a year later, on April 11, 1977, the House Committee on
the Judiciary formally disapproved the substantive amendment311
to Rule 6(e).312 The Senate Committee redrafted the Rule.313 Es-
chewing the House plan to consider the exceptions to secrecy as
part of an overall reform bill,314 the Senate recommended passage,
and Congress finally adopted the proposed amendment, as modi-
fied, on July 30, 1977.315 It parsed Rule 6(e) into enumerated
paragraphs,316 beginning with the general rule of secrecy and de-
                                                                                                             
Patty Hearst case, the Daniel Ellsburg/Pentagon Papers case, the Harrisburg 7 case, the
John Fuerst case, the Tallahassee 23/Vietnam Veterans Against the War case, and the
Camden 28 case); Michael Deutsch, The Improper Use of the Federal Grand Jury: An In-
strument for the Internment of Political Activists, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1159,
1179-83 (1984).
311. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Hearings Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 272 (1977). The amendment to Rule 6(e) also included a technical change to make
the Rule “consistent with other provisions in the Rules and in the Bail Reform Act of
1966.” Id. at 274.
312. “Present Rule 6(e) does not clearly spell out when, under what circumstances, and
to whom grand jury information can be disclosed. It ought to be rewritten entirely.” H.R.
REP. NO. 195, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977), reprinted in Proposed Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 275 (1977) (Appendix 6)
(citation omitted).
313. S. REP NO. 354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N.
527, 530-31.
314. H.R. REP. NO. 195, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977), reprinted in Proposed Amend-
ments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 275 (1977)
(Appendix 6).
315. Act of July 30, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-78, 91 Stat. 319 (1977) (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. app. (1994)).
316. S. REP NO. 354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N.
527, 530-31. The Rule, as adopted, read as follows:
(1) General Rule of Secrecy. A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an
operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an
attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under
paragraph (2)(A)(ii) of this subdivision shall not disclose matters occurring be-
fore the grand jury, except as otherwise provided for in these rules. No obliga-
tion of secrecy may be imposed an any person except in accordance with this
rule. A knowing violation of Rule 6 may be punished as a contempt of court.
(2) Exceptions.—
(A) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before
the grand jury, other than its deliberations and the vote of any grand juror,
may be made to—
(i) an attorney for the government for use in the performance of such attor-
ney’s duty; and
(ii) such government personnel (including personnel of a state or subdivision
of a state) as are deemed necessary by an attorney for the government to assist
an attorney for the government in the performance of such attorney’s duty to
enforce federal criminal law.
(B) Any person to whom matters are disclosed under subparagraph (A)(ii) of
this paragraph shall not utilize that grand jury material for any purpose other
than assisting the attorney for the government in the performance of such at-
torney’s duty to enforce Federal criminal law. An attorney for the government
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limiting exceptions to that general rule.317 As explained in the
Senate Report recommending passage, subparagraph (A) defined
“automatic” but expressly limited disclosure exceptions to “an at-
torney for the government” and those personnel necessary to as-
sist that attorney in the enforcement of criminal law.318 The Advi-
sory Committee’s notes to the 1977 amendment are in accord
with the Senate Report and show an intention to limit disclosure,
but only for the criminal case under consideration.319 To
strengthen court supervision and resolve potential claims of im-
proper automatic disclosure, the Senate substitute also added to
subparagraph (B) new language that required a record of the per-
sonnel obtaining automatic access to grand jury material under
subparagraph (A).320 Thus, the new language of Rule 6(e), con-
                                                                                                             
shall promptly provide the district court, before which was impaneled the
grand jury whose material has been so disclosed, with the names of the persons
to whom such disclosure has been made.
(C) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before
the grand jury may also be made—
(i) when so directed by a court preliminary to or in connection with a judicial
proceeding: or
(ii) when permitted by a court at the request of the defendant, upon a show-
ing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of
matters occurring before the grand jury.
(3) SEALED INDICTMENTS—The Federal magistrate to whom an indict-
ment is returned may direct that the indictment be kept secret until the defen-
dant is in custody or has been released pending trial. Thereupon the clerk shall
seal the indictment and no person shall disclose the return of the indictment
except when necessary for the issuance and execution of a warrant or sum-
mons.
Act of July 30, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-78, §§ 1-3, 91 Stat. 319, 319-21 (1977) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. app. (1994)).
317. In 1979, Rule 6(e) was again amended to require recording of proceedings. The re-
quirement caused the paragraphs to be renumbered so that the 1977 paragraph 1 became
paragraph 2 and the 1977 paragraph 2 became paragraph 3, which is how the rule reads
now in 1996. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e).
318. S. REP NO. 354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N.
527, 531. The language of the report states that disclosure otherwise prohibited “may be
made to an attorney for the government for use in the performance of his duty and to such
personnel as are deemed necessary by an attorney for the government to assist an attorney
for the government in the performance of such an attorney’s duty to enforce Federal crimi-
nal law.” Id. Note that the singular form chosen by the Senate Report—“an attorney”—
echoes the 1945 Advisory Commitee’s note.
319. Although the case law is limited, the trend seems to be in the direction of
allowing disclosure to government personnel who assist attorneys for the gov-
ernment in situations where their expertise is required. This is subject to the
qualification that the matters disclosed be used only for the purposes of the
grand jury investigation.
Id. at 6 (citation omitted).
320. S. REP. NO. 354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N.
527, 530-31. Subparagraph (B) added the specificity requirement that enables court su-
pervision of personnel allowed access to grand jury materials but does not connect the per-
sonnel to the specific material disclosed, as suggested by Judge Becker in Hawthorne v.
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gressional intent, and the Advisory Committee’s position demon-
strate that disclosure is automatic only when the material is
sought to aid criminal prosecutions. The 1977 amendment did not
affect the court-order exception by which access could be gained
for civil use.321 As part of the inevitable congressional compro-
mise, however, the Senate Report included language that seem-
ingly encouraged court-ordered disclosure for civil or regulatory
purposes.322 Thus, the resolution of the 1977 Rule 6 amendment,
which reflected the never-ending dichotomy between law en-
forcement and the rights of the accused, presented questions for
further litigation. The language of the amendment was ambigu-
ous enough to leave open an argument that the criminal law limi-
tation applied only to personnel assisting the grand jury and did
not foreclose automatic disclosure to civil attorneys for civil use.323
Hence, the 1977 Amendment still failed to resolve the questions
of civil use that emerged even prior to the 1946 codification.
                                                                                                             
Director of Internal Revenue Service, 406 F. Supp. 1098, 1127 (1975), and Judge
Hufstedler in In re J.R. Simplot Co., 77-1 U.S. Tax Cases (CCH) ¶ 9146 (1976).
321. What had been the second sentence of the 1946 codification became subparagraph
(C) and remained unchanged.
322. The Rule, as redrafted, is designed to accommodate the belief on the one
hand that Federal prosecutors should be able, without the time-consuming re-
quirement of prior judicial interposition, to make such disclosures of grand jury
information to other government personnel as they deem necessary to facilitate
the performance of their duties relating to criminal law enforcement. On the
other hand, the Rule seeks to allay the concerns of those who fear that such
prosecutorial power will lead to misuse of the grand jury to enforce non-
criminal Federal laws by (1) providing a clear prohibition, subject to the pen-
alty of contempt and (2) requiring that a court order under paragraph (C) be
obtained to authorize such a disclosure. There is, however, no intent to pre-
clude the use of grand jury-developed evidence for civil law enforcement pur-
poses. On the contrary, there is no reason why such use is improper, assuming
that the grand jury was utilized for the legitimate purpose of a criminal inves-
tigation. Accordingly, the Committee believes and intends that the basis for a
court’s refusal to issue an order made under paragraph (C) to enable the gov-
ernment to disclose grand jury information in a non-criminal proceeding should
be no more restrictive than is the case today under prevailing court decisions.
[See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683-85 (1958); Rob-
ert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of IRS, 406 F. Supp. 1098 (E.D. Pa. 1976)] It is
contemplated that the judicial hearing in connection with an application for a
court order by the government under subparagraph (3)(C)(i) should be ex parte
so as to preserve, to the maximum extent possible, grand jury secrecy. [But see
In re J.R. Simplot Co., 77-1 U.S. Tax Cases (CCH) ¶ 9146 (1976)].
S. REP. NO. 354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 527, 531.
323. See In re Grand Jury, 583 F.2d 128, 130 (5th Cir. 1978).
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B.   1981 Amendment Proposal
 In October 1981, the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure circulated a thoroughly amended preliminary
draft of Rule 6(e) to the bench, bar, and media.324 The secrecy re-
visions included:
(1) a definition of “matters occurring” in 6(e)(2);325
(2) an express provision limiting disclosure only to an
“attorney for the government” for criminal enforcement purposes
in 6(e)(3)(A)(i);326
(3) an additional exception under 6(e)(3)(C) allowing disclosure
when a party in another proceeding has an independent basis for
subpoenaing grand jury evidence;327
(4) an additional exception under 6(e)(3)(C) allowing disclosure
to another federal grand jury;328
(5) a new section 6(e)(3)(D) establishing venue for disclosure
petitions and affording interested parties notice of the petitions
plus an opportunity to be heard;329
(6) guidelines in a new section 6(e)(3)(E) for transferring grand
jury materials to another federal district;330
(7) a new section 6(e)(5) providing for closed hearings on mat-
ters relating to grand jury proceedings in order to keep secret
past and pending or continuing grand jury proceedings;331 and
(8) a new section 6(e)(6) requiring grand jury records, orders,
and subpoenas to be kept under seal.332
Two years later, the Supreme Court transmitted slightly modi-
fied versions of proposals four through eight to Congress for adop-
tion.333 The amendments strengthened the shroud of secrecy sur-
rounding grand jury proceedings but ultimately did not address the
civil access issues that have persisted since Procter & Gamble.
The first and third proposals were a response to the confusion
over what constituted “matters occurring.”334 The two proposals
                                                                                                             
324. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure, 91 F.R.D. 289 (1981).
325. Id. at 301.
326. Id. at 302.
327. Id. at 302-03.
328. Id. at 303.
329. Id. at 303-04.
330. Id. at 304.
331. Id. at 304-05.
332. Id. at 305.
333. In re Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 97 F.R.D.
245 (1983).
334. Preliminary Draft, 91 F.R.D. at 305-06.
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were withdrawn because, according to the Advisory Committee
chairman, they were unnecessary.335 An examination of the next
ten years of reported cases leads to the opposite conclusion, how-
ever.336 Clarifying the definition in the rule would have extended
the shroud of secrecy over all the material subpoenaed by a grand
jury and would have avoided litigation on the technicalities of
how a grand jury uses books, papers, and documents. Instead,
litigation over “matters occurring” proliferated, and the resulting
decisions have not been uniform.337
The second proposal, which would have explicitly limited dis-
closure to government attorneys “to enforce federal criminal law,”
was withdrawn by the Advisory Committee because the Supreme
Court granted certiorari338 to decide whether the automatic dis-
closure exception for “attorneys for the government” extended to
government civil attorneys.
IX.   SELLS AND BAGGOT
In 1983, the United States Supreme Court finally and directly
addressed the government’s civil use of grand jury materials in
United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc. 339 and United States v.
Baggot.340 Sells dealt with the Department of Justice’s use of
grand jury material for civil litigation, while Baggot addressed
the issue of federal administrative agency access.341 Both cases,
perhaps influenced by the proposed 1982 amendment, and cer-
tainly influenced by concerns of fundamental fairness addressed
                                                                                                             
335. Proposed Amendments, 97 F.R.D. at 260 (citing Letter of Transmittal from Walter E.
Hoffman, Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules).
336. For in depth analysis of “matters occurring” case law, see Andrea M. Nervi,
Comment, FRCrP 6(e) and the Disclosure of Documents Reviewed by a Grand Jury, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 221 (1990).
337. See id. (proposing—not unlike 1981 Preliminary Draft proposal—a principled test
of “matters occurring,” framed without reference to grand jury and limited to those docu-
ments created independently of any grand jury investigation). While this Article does not
focus on the problematic issue of what constitutes a “matter occurring,” the author notes
that the procedure proposed in Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass’n would be an
equitable means of determining whether documents could be disclosed. See supra notes
204-09 and accompanying text; see also infra discussion part XIII. Use of such a procedure
would eliminate the resort to fictional definitions of “matters occurring” to allow disclosure
of documents that would have been readily available through civil discovery.
338. United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 456 U.S. 960 (1982).
339. 463 U.S. 418 (1983).
340. 463 U.S. 476 (1983).
341. A third case was decided with Baggot and Sells. This case, Illinois v. Abbott & As-
sociates, 460 U.S. 557 (1983), dealt with a state’s access to federal grand jury materials for
use in prosecuting state criminal laws. The Supreme Court determined that a state, just
like any other private litigant, must meet the “particularized need” standard first set forth
in Procter & Gamble. Id. at 567.
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in lower court opinions, tightened the restrictions on civil use of
grand jury material.
A.   United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc.
In Sells, the Supreme Court revisited the issues presented in
Procter & Gamble , which Congress had consistently failed to
clarify. The Sells Court definitively determined the standards by
which Department of Justice attorneys could gain access to grand
jury materials for use in civil actions.
Sells, like Procter & Gamble , involved parallel criminal and
civil investigations342 and consequently raised the issue of misuse
of the grand jury process.343 The case began as an IRS adminis-
trative audit of Sells Engineering, Inc. and related parties.344 The
IRS, seeking the production of records in the investigation, issued
administrative summonses, many of which the affected parties
challenged.345 The federal district court ordered enforcement of all
of the summonses except those pertaining to one partnership.346
Enforcement of the summonses was stayed pending an appeal of
the decision.347 During the wait, the IRS referred the case to the
Department of Justice for investigation into possible criminal
charges of fraud and income tax evasion.348 The Justice Depart-
ment convened a grand jury, which issued subpoenas349 that re-
quested essentially the same materials sought by the IRS sum-
monses.350 The documents were produced for the grand jury and,
consequently, the IRS did not pursue enforcement of the adminis-
trative summonses.351
As a result of its investigation, the grand jury indicted Sells
Engineering and two of its officers, Peter Sells and Fred Witte,
                                                                                                             
342. Sells, 463 U.S. at 421.
343. Id. at 422.
344. Respondent’s Brief at 1. While the case involved Sells Engineering and several
related business entities, the challenge upon which the decision was based came from Sells
Engineering. Id.
345. Id. at 2.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id. The IRS requested the Department of Justice to begin an open-ended grand
jury investigation. Id. According to the IRS manual in effect at that time, an open-ended
grand jury proceeding referred to an exploratory investigation under the powers of the
grand jury which could be sought by the IRS agents if the administrative proceedings were
stymied. Id. at 2 n.4.
349. Whether the grand jury had any control over these subpoenas at all was a matter
of dispute. Attorneys for Sells argue that some grand jury subpoenas were issued at a time
when no grand jury was even in session. See id. at 28.
350. See id. at 7 n.7.
351. See id. at 3.
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for conspiracy to defraud the government and for tax evasion.
The defendants filed motions to dismiss the indictments, claiming
abuse of the grand jury’s function.352 However, late in the evening
of the day before the motion was scheduled to be heard, the par-
ties reached agreement on a favorable plea bargain (particularly
as to sentencing), and the defendants entered guilty pleas.353 The
defendants also withdrew their complaints of grand jury mis-
use.354
                                                                                                             
352. See id. at 11. In summarizing the allegations of abuse in the Respondent’s Brief,
counsel for Sells wrote:
It was the IRS in this case that initiated the open-ended grand jury investiga-
tion after being “stymied” in the courts in its administrative proceedings. . . . In
this case the same IRS agents participated in the grand jury investigation as
were conducting the prior administrative investigation. . . . In this case no 6(e) or-
ders were obtained for the assistance of [the IRS agents] though they were enlisted
to assist the grand jury over one year before Rule 6(e) was amended. . . . The very
first grand jury subpoenas issued were for the very same records that the IRS
had been judicially “stymied” in obtaining under its administrative summons. .
. . In this case virtually all of the witnesses subpoenaed were diverted to
‘voluntary’ interrogation by a Special Agent of the IRS and did not testify be-
fore the grand jury. . . . [S]everal of these same witnesses were intimidated by
use of the subpoena power into ‘voluntarily’ waiving their fifth amendment rights
in testifying before a special agent, rather than the grand jury, and in signing af-
fidavits prepared by the special agent in a form acceptable to him. . . . In this case
subpoenas appear to have been issued when no grand jury was assembled to
investigate this case and for the purpose of diverting witnesses before a Special
Agent of the IRS. . . . No 6(e) orders were obtained for the use of private stenog-
raphers to take down the “voluntary” interrogations by IRS [agents] conducted
under grand jury subpoena. . . . The IRS made the real decision to prosecute at
its District and Regional offices based on its own review of the evidence. . . .
The only testimony presented to the grand jury to obtain the indictment was
the hearsay testimony of government agents summarizing their view of the
evidence and of the testimony of all the “witnesses.” . . . The grand jury had no
real evaluation of the evidence and facts but were essentially directed by the
predetermination of the IRS and its selective presentation . . . . As a plea bar-
gain condition, defendants were required to execute a very detailed and itemized
Agreed Statement of Facts scheduling and explaining every false deduction from
which their exact tax liability could be calculated—prepared by the IRS directly
from grand jury materials without any 6(e) order. . .
Id. at 28-29.
353. See id. at 10 n.20:
The Disposition Agreement was negotiated and entered into in a late night
negotiation session directly with U.S. Attorney . . . and finalized only hours be-
fore the calendared hearing on respondents’ comprehensive grand jury abuse
motion seeking among other things, an evidentiary proceeding on the abuse is-
sues. . . . It was the concern as to what would be developed in an evidentiary
hearing that respondents believe persuaded the U.S. Attorneys office to enter
into the late night Disposition Agreement, including an agreed limitation on
sentencing.
354. Id. at 11: “On Friday, December 15, 1978, respondents Sells and Witte entered
guilty pleas to one count of conspiracy tax fraud. This mooted the grand jury abuse issue to
be heard that day in the criminal case resulting in the motion being withdrawn and not
argued in that case as originally calendared.”
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After the pleas were entered, the government moved for dis-
closure of the grand jury materials to attorneys in the civil fraud
division of the Department of Justice for use in a possible civil
suit. The district court granted this request on the grounds that
the civil division attorneys had automatic access as attorneys for
the government under Rule 6(e)(A)(i). On appeal, the Ninth Cir-
cuit reversed, holding that civil attorneys only could gain access
by meeting the standard originally set forth in Procter & Gam-
ble.355 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.356
Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan focused on the general
reasons for grand jury secrecy, the limited policy reasons for
granting government attorneys access to grand jury materials in
criminal cases, and the legislative history of Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure Rule 6(e).357 Analyzing the historical per-
spective behind grand jury secrecy,358 the Court revived the for-
gotten notion that the secret grand jury process was created to
protect the individual from unfair and unfounded accusations.359
Justice Brennan also recognized the grand jury’s broad investiga-
tory powers (without which it would be unable to decide whether
to indict360) as well as its need for secrecy to gather the informa-
tion necessary to determine whether probable cause existed to
indict.361
The majority then analyzed the legislative history of Rule 6(e)
and concluded that the Justice Department’s own representa-
tive,362 as well as the Advisory Committee’s notes,363 demon-
                                                                                                             
355. United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 642 F.2d 1184, 1186 (9th Cir. 1981).
356. United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 456 U.S. 960 (1982).
357. United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 426 (1983).
358. Id. at 424.
359. Id. (“Grand jury secrecy, then, is ‘as important for the protection of the innocent
as for the pursuit of the guilty.’ ”). The Court viewed the historical purpose of the grand
jury as “[a] dual function of determining if there is probable cause to believe that a crime
has been committed and of protecting citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions.”
Id. at 423.
360. Id. at 423-24:
These broad powers are necessary to permit the grand jury to carry out both
parts of its dual function. Without thorough and effective investigation, the
grand jury would be unable either to ferret out crimes deserving of prosecution,
or to screen out charges not warranting prosecution.
361. “We consistently have recognized that the proper functioning of our grand jury
system depends upon the secrecy of grand jury proceedings.” Id. at 424.
362. Admitting that it would be a bad idea to allow agency personnel to have auto-
matic use of grand jury materials for civil purposes, Acting Deputy Attorney General
Richard Thornburgh had stated:
The cleanest example I can think of where a 6(e) order is clearly required is
where a criminal fraud investigation before a grand jury fails to produce
enough legally admissible evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
criminal fraud ensued. It would be the practice of the Department at that time to
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strated that Congress had never intended disclosure for civil pur-
poses and that Congress would have to make clear its intention to
bypass the important rule of secrecy.364
Examining the limited policy reasons for granting government
attorneys access to grand jury materials, Justice Brennan ques-
tioned the wisdom of giving access at all, even to prosecutors.365
However, he recognized that a modern grand jury would be se-
verely limited without the assistance of an attorney for the gov-
ernment to present evidence and explain the law; moreover, the
prosecutor would have difficulty determining whether to prose-
cute a case if not informed of the evidence going before the grand
jury.366 Nevertheless, Justice Brennan saw no similar policy rea-
sons for extending disclosure to government civil attorneys.367 In
fact, he noted several reasons to preclude civil attorneys from
gaining access to grand jury materials.
                                                                                                             
seek a 6(e) order from the court in order that evidence could be made available
for whatever civil consequences might ensue.
Id. at 439 (emphasis added). Ironically, although Sells was precisely the type of case to
which Thornburgh had referred, the Department of Justice was now arguing for automatic
access.
363. Citing the Advisory Committee’s notes to the 1977 Amendment, the Court stated:
This paragraph reflects the distinction the Senate Committee had in mind:
“Federal prosecutors” are given a free hand concerning use of grand jury ma-
terials, at least pursuant to their “duties relating to criminal law enforcement”;
but disclosure of “grand jury-developed evidence for civil law enforcement pur-
poses” requires a (c)(i) court order.
Id. at 441-42.
364. Id. at 425.
365. Id. at 428 (“Given the strong historic policy of preserving grand jury secrecy, one
might wonder why Government attorneys are given any automatic access at all.”).
366. Id. at 430:
[A] modern grand jury would be much less effective without the assistance of
the prosecutor’s office and the investigative resources it commands. The prose-
cutor ordinarily brings matters to the attention of the grand jury and gathers
the evidence required for the jury’s consideration. Although the grand jury may
itself decide to investigate a matter or to seek certain evidence, it depends
largely on the prosecutor’s office to secure the evidence or witnesses it requires.
The prosecutor also advises the lay jury on the applicable law. The prosecutor
in turn needs to know what transpires before the grand jury in order to per-
form his own duty properly. If he considers that the law and the admissible
evidence will not support a conviction, he can be expected to advise the grand
jury not to indict. He must also examine indictments, and the basis for their is-
suance, to determine whether it is in the interests of justice to proceed with
prosecution.
367. Id. at 431:
None of these considerations, however, provides any support for breaching
grand jury secrecy in favor of government attorneys other than prosecutors—
either by allowing them into the grand jury room, or by granting them uncon-
trolled access to grand jury materials. An attorney with only civil duties lacks
both the prosecutor’s special role in supporting the grand jury, and the prose-
cutor’s own crucial need to know what occurs before the grand jury.
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First, disclosure increased the number of people having infor-
mation and thus inherently increased the risk of illegal leaks.368
Second, disclosure posed a threat to the functioning of the grand
jury by raising the possibility an attorney would use a witness’s
statements against the witness in a later civil forum.369 Third,
disclosure threatened the integrity of the grand jury itself: if
prosecutors knew that grand jury information might be helpful to
their civil colleagues, they would be tempted to elicit evidence for
that purpose.370 Such misconduct not only would subvert the
grand jury process, but also would be difficult to prove if it did oc-
cur.371 Fourth, Justice Brennan found that use of grand jury ma-
terial for civil purposes would subvert the civil discovery process
as well.372 Discussing this fourth reason, he explained:
To allow these agencies to circumvent their usual methods of
discovery would not only subvert the limitations and proce-
dural requirements built into those methods, but would grant
to the Government a virtual ex parte form of discovery, from
which its civil litigation opponents are excluded unless they
make a strong showing of particularized need.373
Implicit in this analysis is Justice Brennan’s recognition of the
fundamental fairness issues presented by the discovery proceed-
ings attacked in Sells. Thus, the Court determined that use of the
grand jury process to aid agency civil lawsuits must not under-
mine grand jury secrecy.
Observing that the primary interest of the government civil at-
torney was to save time and expense through access to the grand
jury investigation,374 Justice Brennan stated that “[w]e have con-
sistently rejected the argument that such savings can justify a
                                                                                                             
368. Id. at 432.
369. Id.
370. Id.:
If prosecutors in a given case knew their colleagues would be free to use the
materials generated by the grand jury for a civil case, they might be tempted to
manipulate the grand jury’s powerful investigative tools to root out additional
evidence useful in the civil suit, or even to start or continue a grand jury in-
quiry where no criminal prosecution seemed likely.
371. Id. at 432; see also supra text accompanying notes 217-60.
372. Sells, 463 U.S. at 433.
373. Id. at 433-34.
374. Id. at 431:
Of course, it would be of substantial help to a Justice Department civil attor-
ney if he had free access to a storehouse of evidence compiled by a grand jury;
but that is of a different order from the prosecutor’s need for access. The civil
lawyer’s need is ordinarily nothing more than a matter of saving time and ex-
pense.
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breach of grand jury secrecy.”375 Consequently, the Court held
that government civil attorneys must obtain a court order to ob-
tain disclosure of grand jury materials for civil use.376
The Sells Court based much of its decision on its apparent ac-
ceptance of the Ninth Circuit’s premise that automatic disclosure
encouraged abuse of the grand jury process.377 Interestingly, the
Department of Justice argued that denial of automatic disclosure
to civil attorneys exacerbated the potential for grand jury abuse
because Rule 6(e) did not preclude assigning responsibility for
both criminal and civil liability to a single attorney.378 Strict en-
forcement against disclosure, it contended, would therefore
“foster grand jury abuse by encouraging such dual assign-
ments.”379 The Supreme Court left that argument unanswered.380
 After concluding that a court order was necessary for disclo-
sure, the Court then addressed the standard of need the govern-
ment had to meet. Finding that the government attorneys must
show the same particularized compelling need as private liti-
gants,381 the Court indicated that the balancing test could take
                                                                                                             
375. Id.
376. Id. at 442. Although providing a prophylactic rule to eliminate grand jury abuse,
Sells placed a heavy burden upon the government in investigating and initiating civil
suits. Duplicating grand jury investigations is extremely costly and time consuming. The
Sells rule seems to insulate grand jury materials that would have been discoverable
through use of government civil investigative devices simply because the information went
before the grand jury. The procedure presented in Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers
Ass’n, which, like Sells, does not allow automatic disclosure, balances the government’s
need for the information against the need to guard against grand jury abuse. See supra
notes 204-09 and accompanying text; see also discussion infra part XIII.
377. In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 78-184, 642 F.2d 1184, 1190 (9th Cir. 1981)
(“To grant the government an absolute right of access to grand jury materials for civil use
might irresistibly encourage use of the grand jury as a tool of civil discovery. It would also
severely limit court review of any such abuse.”).
378. See Petition for Certiorari at 13:
The rule clearly permits attorneys who become privy to grand jury material
by assisting a grand jury employ that material for civil litigation purposes, and
it does not prohibit the Attorney General from assigning criminal and civil liti-
gation responsibilities arising from a common nucleus of operative facts to a
single attorney. Indeed, if it were true, as the court of appeals apparently sup-
posed, that the temptation to abuse the grand jury process is irresistible, and
that there are no other adequate safeguards against such abuse, one could only
conclude that the court of appeals’ interpretation of Rule 6(e)(3) would foster
grand jury abuse encouraging such dual assignments.
379. See id. at 17-18 n.11. Similarly, Associate Deputy Attorney General Jay Stephens,
testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee on a bill that would have permitted con-
gressional access to grand jury information on a showing of “substantial need,” empha-
sized that congressional oversight of grand jury investigations would compromise the Jus-
tice Department’s conduct of a criminal investigation by injecting congressional influence
into the proceedings. Senate Committee Urged Not to Give Congress Access to Grand Jury
Data, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, Nov. 25, 1985, at A5.
380. Sells, 463 U.S. at 431 n.15.
381. Id. at 444.
60 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:1
into consideration the “public interest” in disclosure to the gov-
ernment, as well as any alternative discovery tools available to
obtain such information.382 Thus, Sells, relying upon the impor-
tance of grand jury secrecy, foreclosed automatic disclosure of
grand jury materials to government attorneys for use in civil pro-
ceedings. The Sells balancing test, which takes alternative dis-
covery devices into consideration, comes close to the test this
author advocates;383 unlike the method proposed in Maryland &
Virginia Milk Producers Ass’n , however, the Sells test fails to set
forth a workable method for weighing these interests. Further,
one primary distinction between Sells and the proposed test is
that Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass’n  precludes disclo-
sure for civil purposes of information that government attorneys
could not obtain through the government’s civil investigative de-
vices. This would ensure that evidence obtainable through use of
the grand jury’s extraordinarily broad powers but not through
civil discovery—such as immunized, self-incriminating testi-
mony—would never form the basis of a civil lawsuit.
B.   United States v. Baggot
Having decided in Sells that disclosure to the Civil Division of
the Department of Justice required a court order, the Supreme
Court turned to interpreting Rule 6(e) as it applied to federal
administrative agencies.384 United States v. Baggot 385 involved a
large-scale investigation into possible criminal violations of the
Commodities Exchange Act and the Internal Revenue Code.386
The investigation spanned two grand jury terms and targeted
James Baggot.387 As a result of plea negotiations, Baggot was not
indicted but pled guilty to two misdemeanor violations of the
Commodities Exchange Act.388 Part of the plea bargain required
Baggot to read to the grand jury a government-prepared state-
                                                                                                             
382. Id. at 445.
383. See supra notes 204-09 and accompanying text; see also discussion infra part XIII.
384. Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i) provides:
(C) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before
the grand jury may also be made—
(i) when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in connection with a judi-
cial proceeding.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i).
385. 463 U.S. 476 (1983).
386. Petitioner’s Brief at 3.
387. Respondent’s Brief Opposing Petition for Certiorari at 2.
388. Petitioner’s Brief at 4.
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ment based upon his confession during the plea negotiations.389
The Department of Justice then filed a motion for disclosure of
the grand jury transcripts to the Internal Revenue Service for use
in a tax audit against Baggot.390
The government contended that the historical precedent of
disclosing grand jury material to the IRS justified its continua-
tion, arguing that the 1977 legislative history showed congres-
sional awareness of the practice.391 The Baggot Court faced the
same issues that arose in Doe v. Rosenberry .392 The threshold
question was thus “whether the IRS’s civil tax audit is
‘preliminar[y] to or in connection with a judicial proceeding’ un-
der (C)(i).”393 The Court concluded that it was not.394
Writing again for the majority in this long-awaited and defini-
tive ruling, Justice Brennan stated that the language of Rule
6(e)(3)(C)(i) “contemplate[d] only uses related fairly directly to
some identifiable litigation, pending or anticipated,”395 stressing
that the focus of this exception was on the actual use to be made
of the requested materials.396 The Court found that this language
reflected “a judgment that not every beneficial purpose, or even
every valid governmental purpose, is an appropriate reason for
breaching grand jury secrecy.”397 The Court also noted that be-
cause the IRS’s tax assessments were self-executing, no necessity
existed for a judicial proceeding.398 Allowing disclosure in this cir-
cumstance, where the primary use of the grand jury materials
was for an extrajudicial proceeding,399 would have abrogated the
rule.400 While the Court’s decision left unanswered many ques-
                                                                                                             
389. Id.
390. “The substance of Baggot’s crime was a scheme to use sham commodities trans-
actions to create paper losses, which he deducted on his tax returns. A fraction of the
‘losses’ was then recovered in cash kickbacks which were not reported as income.” Baggot,
463 U.S. at 477.
391. Supreme Court: Grand Jury Disclosure to IRS Debated, DAILY REP. FOR EX-
ECUTIVES, Mar. 4, 1983, at G6.
392. 255 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1958). See also supra text accompanying notes 273-76.
393. Baggot, 463 U.S. at 478.
394. Id. at 479.
395. Id. at 480.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. Id. at 481.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 479-82.
The provision in (c)(i) that disclosure may be made ‘preliminarily to or in
connection with a judicial proceeding’ is, on its face, an affirmative limitation
on the availability of court-ordered disclosure of grand jury materials. . . .
Where an agency’s action does not require resort to litigation to accomplish the
agency’s present goal, the action is not preliminary to a judicial proceeding for
purposes of (C)(i).
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tions regarding administrative agency access,401 and apparently
was confined to consideration of IRS procedures, it effectively
closed the door on agency use of grand jury materials for purely
administrative purposes.402
As a result of Baggot and Sells, government attorneys who
sought access to grand jury materials for civil or administrative
use clearly would have to obtain them through a court order. Al-
though these cases provided a prophylactic bright-line rule that
protected the individual against government abuse, they did so at
the expense of government efficiency. Controversy over these
rulings arose immediately.
X.   1985 AMENDMENT TO RULE 6(E)
In 1985, the Supreme Court again strengthened the secrecy
language of Rule 6(e) by requiring attorneys for the government
to certify to the supervising court that they had expressly advised
persons obtaining automatic access to grand jury information un-
der subsection (A)(ii) of their obligation to keep grand jury infor-
mation secret.403 In addition to this amendment, Rule 6(e) was at
the same time expanded to permit disclosure of information to
enhance state criminal prosecutions.404 This expansion of Rule
6(e) to aid state prosecutions marked the beginning of an execu-
tive branch effort to dilute the protective role of the grand jury.
The Department of Justice acknowledged the limitations
placed upon their civil investigatory process by Sells and Baggot.
                                                                                                             
Id. at 482.
401. Id. at 482-83 n.6. The Court did not decide whether the rule would be different for
agencies that did have to resort to a court for enforcement of their rules: “We decline in
this case to address how firm the agency’s decision to litigate must be before its investiga-
tion can be characterized as ‘preliminar[y] to a judicial proceeding,’ or whether it can ever
be so regarded before the conclusion of a formal preliminary administrative investigation.”
Id.
402. Id. at 483 (comparing court-approved disclosure granted in In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings (Miller Brewing Co.), 687 F.2d 1079 (7th Cir. 1982), where court recourse was
clearly anticipated, with case at bar and stating that “[i]n such a case, the Government’s
primary purpose is plainly to use the materials sought to defend the Tax Court litigation,
rather than to conduct the administrative inquiry that preceded it”).
403. Supreme Court of the United States, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 105
F.R.D. 179, 180-81 (1985).
404. Id. A new paragraph was added to Rule 6(e) allowing access “when permitted by a
court at the request of an attorney for the government, upon a showing that such matters
may disclose a violation of state criminal law, to an appropriate official of a state or sub-
division of a state for the purpose of enforcing such law.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(iv).
This amendment overcame the particularized need standard that the Supreme Court im-
posed upon states seeking to obtain federal grand jury information in Illinois v. Abbott &
Associates, 460 U.S. 557 (1983). While the amendment did expand the disclosure excep-
tions, disclosure under this section is only allowed for state criminal law purposes.
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The current Department of Justice Manual, citing Sells, clearly
instructs that “[d]isclosure to government attorneys and their
assistants for use in a civil suit is permissible only with a court
order under Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i).”405 The Manual further concedes
that “it is clear that Rule 6(e) does not authorize disclosure to at-
torneys for other federal government agencies.”406 The Manual
outlines the procedure and standard by which a federal agency
may obtain grand jury materials, explaining that “[a] failure to
demonstrate sufficient need can result in the denial of a request
for otherwise permissible disclosure.”407 While the Department of
Justice outwardly indicated its reluctant compliance with the
mandates of Sells and Baggot, the Manual also clearly enunciates
the Department’s “position that the particularized need require-
ment is inapplicable when grand jury materials are sought for
federal law enforcement purposes.”408
Notwithstanding the certification and state enhancement
amendments, a congressional stalemate developed between
members who favored strengthening the enforce-
ment/investigative role of the grand jury and those who favored
strengthening its protective/investigative role. This clash was
epitomized by two diametrically opposed grand jury measures in-
troduced in 1985.
From May 1985 until August 1986, hearings were held in the
House of Representatives on Representative John Conyer’s Model
Grand Jury Act.409 The purpose of the proposed Act was to inject
comprehensive due process safeguards into grand jury proceed-
ings and insure their protective role.410 The proposal died in
                                                                                                             
405. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-11.250 (1992 Supp.).
406. Id.
407. Id. at § 9-11.252.
408. Id.
409. H.R. 1407, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). Representative Conyers introduced H.R.
1407 on March 8, 1985. The Bill was referred to committee on May 8, 1985. Hearings were
held. The last mention of the bill was when it was scheduled for markup on August 7,
1986. The bill then vanished from the Congressional Record.
410. The proposal would have (1) authorized the presence of a witness’s attorney in the
grand jury room; (2) provided transactional immunity to a witness who is compelled to give
self-incriminating testimony; (3) required that the target of an investigation be permitted
to testify before the grand jury if the target wished to do so; (4) precluded the use of evi-
dence seized in violation of the constitutional rights of the target; and (5) required that the
government present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. Id. In proposing the bill, Rep-
resentative Conyers stated:
The time is long overdue for Congress to bring the Federal grand jury out of
the dark ages and into the 20th century with realistic reform. If enacted, my
legislation will return the Federal grand jury to its historical role as a people’s
watchdog against overzealous prosecutors and governmental corruption.
131 CONG. REC. 4564 (1985).
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committee411 and was the last major effort by Congress at federal
grand jury reform.412
The first major legislative effort to undermine the protective
role of Rule 6(e) began soon thereafter. On September 18, 1985,
Representative George Gekas introduced House Bill 3340, the
Grand Jury Disclosure Amendments Act.413 Two days later, Sena-
tor Strom Thurmond introduced virtually the same bill414 as part
of the Reagan Administration’s legislative initiative aimed at
                                                                                                             
411. See supra note 410.
412. Grand jury reform bills continue to be offered in the Congress, but, since 1986,
they have been much more narrowly drawn. See, e.g., S. 284, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985)
(allowing witness’s counsel into grand jury proceedings); H.R. 5367, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess.
(1986) (requiring dismissal of indictment following prosecutorial abuse).
413. H.R. 3340, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); see also 131 CONG. REC. 11,875 (1985).
414. S. 1676, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) [hereinafter Disclosure Amendments Act].
Senator Thurmond’s amendment to Rule 6(e) was as follows:
(A) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before
the grand jury, other than its deliberations and the vote of any grand juror,
may be made to—
(i) any attorney for the government for use in the performance of an attorney
for the government’s duty to enforce federal criminal or civil law; and
(ii) such government personnel (including personnel of a State or subdivision
of a State) as are deemed necessary by an attorney for the government to assist
an attorney for the government in the performance of such attorney’s duty to
enforce federal criminal law.
(B) Any person to whom matters are disclosed under subparagraph (A)(ii) of
this paragraph shall not utilize that grand jury material for any purpose other
than assisting an attorney for the government in the performance of such at-
torney’s duty to enforce federal criminal or civil law. An attorney for the gov-
ernment shall promptly provide the district court, before which was impaneled
the grand jury whose material has been so disclosed, with the names of the
persons to whom such disclosure has been made, and shall certify that the at-
torney has advised such persons of their obligation of secrecy under this rule.
(C) Disclosure otherwise prohibited under this rule of matters occurring be-
fore the grand jury may also be made—
(i) when so directed by a court, upon a showing of particularized need, pre-
liminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding;
(ii) when permitted by a court at the request of the defendant, upon a show-
ing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of
matters occurring before the grand jury;
(iii) when the disclosure is made by an attorney for the government to an-
other federal grand jury;
(iv) when permitted by a court at the request of an attorney for the govern-
ment, upon a showing that such matters may disclose a violation of State
criminal law, to an appropriate official of a State of [sic] subdivision of a State
for the purpose of enforcing such law; or
(v) at the request of an attorney for the government, and when so permitted
by a court upon a showing of substantial need, to personnel of any department
or agency of the United States—
(I) when such personnel are deemed necessary to provide assistance to an at-
torney for the Government in the performance of such attorney’s duty to en-
force Federal civil law, or
(II) for use in relation to any matter within the jurisdiction of such depart-
ment or agency.
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fraud in government procurement.415 The Department of Justice
initiated the Grand Jury Disclosure Amendments Act416 to over-
come the “impediments” created by Sells and Baggot.417 The pro-
posed legislation also purported to answer the question left open
in Sells by permitting the same federal prosecutor to use grand
jury materials in a companion civil case.418 During the congres-
sional debate over these proposed amendments the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in United States v. John Doe, Inc. 419
XI.   UNITED STATES V. JOHN DOE, INC.
United States v. John Doe, Inc. 420 was a case in which the De-
partment of Justice convened a grand jury as part of a criminal
antitrust investigation against several American corporations for
price-fixing in tallow sales to foreign countries.421 Although the
targeted corporation challenged jurisdiction under the Sherman
Act,422 the grand jury investigation continued for two years, after
which time the Department of Justice “tentatively concluded”
                                                                                                             
415. 131 CONG. REC. 11,875 (1985) (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
416. “The Department of Justice and the Attorney General are to be commended for
initiating this legislative effort.” Id.
Little nuances in the section-by-section analysis also indicate that the Department of
Justice drafted the legislation. For example, note 1 of the section-by-section analysis reads:
“We have included in our proposed statute the amendments to Rule 6(d) . . . .” Id. at
11,879. Further on, the analysis states: “This provision will provide the only available
method of disclosure for private parties. It can also be used by government agencies when
the Justice Department exercises its discretion. . . . [G]overnment agencies with independ-
ent litigating authority would thus be able, over our objection, to gain access to grand jury
material . . . .” Id. at 11,875 (Bills and Brief Accompanying Materials appended to Sen.
Thurmond’s remarks).
417. [T]his proposal contains amendments to Rule 6(e) designed to overcome
the impediments caused by Sells and Baggot to the government’s ability to pur-
sue important non-criminal remedies.
. . . .
. . . [T]o whatever extent Sells precludes or minimizes a court’s consideration
of the government’s saving time or increasing efficiency in its disclosure de-
terminations, Sells no longer applies. . . .
This amendment would overrule Baggot . . . .
 Id. at 11,875.
418. Id. (“The amendment also answers the ‘same attorney’ question left undecided in
Sells by allowing the criminal prosecutor to use grand jury materials in a companion civil
case.”); see also Sells, 463 U.S. at 431 n.15.
419. 476 U.S. 1140 (1986).
420. 481 U.S. 102 (1987).
421. Doe, 481 U.S. at 104.
422. Although no sales were being made in the United States, the Justice Department
pursued an investigation into possible violations of the Sherman Act. Respondent’s Brief at
1 (“The theory of the grand jury investigation was that Sherman Act jurisdiction existed
for sales of drummed tallow, even though that commodity is not sold within the United
States, because foreign countries sometimes use some funds appropriated for their use by
Congress to pay for the commodity.”).
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that the companies had violated the Sherman Act but that it
would not seek indictments.423 After the grand jury’s dismissal,
the Department of Justice immediately began civil proceedings
with the same attorneys who had conducted the criminal investi-
gation.424 The attorneys issued to the companies Civil Investiga-
tive Demands that were “essentially copies of earlier grand jury
subpoenas.”425 Two of the companies refused to comply with the
Civil Investigative Demands.426 As a result of the civil investiga-
tion, the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department concluded
that the companies had violated the Sherman Act and possibly
the False Claims Act as well.427 The Antitrust Division attorneys
then requested and received a Rule 6(e) order allowing disclosure
of grand jury materials for consultation with the Justice Depart-
ment’s Civil Division attorneys.428 The “John Doe” corporation
moved to vacate the order and requested that the government be
enjoined from using grand jury materials in the civil suit.429 The
government attorneys admitted using grand jury materials to
prepare for the civil action.430 The Second Circuit held that the
Justice Department’s Criminal Division attorneys could not con-
tinue to use grand jury materials in the subsequent civil proceed-
ing.431
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to answer the question
left open in Sells: whether government attorneys who conducted a
criminal investigation could continue to use grand jury material
for preparation of a civil suit.432 The second issue on appeal was
whether disclosure could be made to the Justice Department’s
Civil Division attorney’s for consultation on the False Claims Act
suit.433 Consequently, the case also presented an opportunity for
                                                                                                             
423. Id. at 4.
424. Doe, 481 U.S. at 105.
425. “The Civil Investigative Demands were accompanied by a letter advising each re-
cipient that the CID could be complied with by certifying that all documents sought had
been produced to the grand jury.” Respondent’s Brief at 2.
426. Doe, 481 U.S. at 105.
427. Id.
428. Id. at 105-06.
429. Id. at 106.
430. “[T]he Antitrust Division conceded to the District Court that at least 90 percent of
the material on which the civil case is based was grand jury material.” Respondent’s Brief
at 3 (citation omitted).
431. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 774 F.2d 34, 42 (2d Cir. 1985), rev’d, 481 U.S. 102
(1987).
432. Doe, 481 U.S. at 104.
433. Id. “Although the Antitrust Division is authorized to prosecute False Claims Act
suits when the conduct in question also violates the antitrust laws, the primary respon-
sibility for the enforcement of that statute rests with the Civil Division of the Department
of Justice.” Petitioner’s Brief at 5.
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the Court to apply the “particularized need” test to a request by
the government for disclosure.434
Addressing the first issue, the Court focused on “the plain
meaning” of the term “disclosure” under Rule 6(e)435 and deter-
mined that no “disclosure” occurred where an attorney, who le-
gitimately obtained information from a grand jury, reviewed that
information in preparing a civil suit.436 However, the Court spe-
cifically narrowed this ruling to allow only “refamiliariz[ation]” of
grand jury material by the attorney who conducted the grand
jury proceeding.437 The Court forbade any use of the materials in
the pleadings or proceeding that might disclose the information
to any other parties.438 Although its holding on this issue was
narrowly drawn to allow only refamiliarization, the Court, in
taking this “plain meaning” approach, ignored the Sells analysis
of potential grand jury abuse and concerns of fundamental fair-
ness of process.439
Turning to the second issue, and confirming that the govern-
ment was subject to the “particularized need” test as first set
forth in Procter & Gamble ,440 the Court concluded that the test
could be more easily met by the government than a private
party.441 Balancing “the public benefits of the disclosure” against
                                                                                                             
434. Doe, 481 U.S. at 111; see also supra text accompanying notes 234-39.
435. Unlike our previous decisions in this area, which have primarily involved
exceptions to the general rule [of secrecy], this case involves a more prelimi-
nary question: what constitutes disclosure?
. . . .
Because we decide this case based on our reading of the Rule’s plain lan-
guage, there is no need to address the parties’ arguments about the extent to
which continued use threatens some of the values of grand jury privacy identi-
fied in our cases and catalogued in Sells Engineering.
Doe, 481 U.S. at 109 (citations omitted).
436. Id. at 108.
437. Id. at 111.
438. Id. at 110.
[I]t is important to emphasize that the issue before us is only whether an at-
torney who was involved in a grand jury investigation (and is therefore pre-
sumably familiar with the “matters occurring before the grand jury”) may later
review that information in a manner that does not involve any further disclo-
sure to others. Without addressing the very different matter of an attorney’s
disclosing grand jury information to others, inadvertently or purposefully, in
the course of a civil proceeding, we hold that Rule 6(e) does not require the at-
torney to obtain a court order before refamiliarizing himself or herself with the
details of a grand jury investigation.
Id. at 111.
439. See supra text accompanying notes 357-73.
440. See supra text accompanying notes 237-39.
441. “[T]he concerns that underlie the policy of grand jury secrecy are implicated to a
much lesser extent when the disclosure merely involves Government attorneys.” Doe, 481
U.S. at 112.
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“the dangers created by the limited disclosure requested,”442 the
Court identified a public interest in the efficient, effective, and
evenhanded enforcement of federal statutes, and focused primar-
ily on avoidance of the costs and delays involved in duplicating
grand jury investigations.443 Balanced against those interests
were the concerns of fair process expressed in Sells.444 The Doe
Court concluded that the benefit of avoiding the cost and delay of
reproducing grand jury material outweighed the interests in
grand jury secrecy, and granted disclosure to the Civil Division
attorneys.445
The Doe Court’s reliance upon the law enforcement interest
undercut the holding of Sells. It also partially achieved the De-
partment of Justice’s goal of overcoming the protective
“impediments” of Sells.446 Justice Brennan, dissenting in Doe,
criticized the majority by observing that the focus in Sells was on
the “actual use” of grand jury information.447 The Doe Court, fo-
cusing on who accessed the information rather than the purpose
of such access, bypassed the very real concerns of grand jury
abuse and fundamental fairness of process raised in Sells, as well
as the Department of Justice’s own admission that the practice of
granting dual assignments to one attorney would “foster” such
                                                                                                             
442. Doe, 481 U.S. at 113. Cf. United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 443
(1983) (citation omitted) (“It is clear . . . that disclosure is appropriate only in those cases
where the need for it outweighs the public interest in secrecy . . . .”).
443. Doe, 481 U.S. at 113.
444. See Sells, 463 U.S. at 418.
445. Doe, 481 U.S. at 116. In its analysis, the Court reasoned that disclosure would not
increase the risk of inadvertent or illegal leaks to others. Id. at 114. The Court found that
the limited use sought by the Department of Justice did not pose the same threat as the
widespread disclosure requested in Sells. Id. Such disclosure, the Court said, would also
have little effect on a future witness’s willingness to testify fully and frankly because dis-
closure would not result in a witness’s testimony being used against him in a civil proceed-
ing. Id. The Court then addressed the issue of manipulating the grand jury to gain infor-
mation for a civil proceeding. Id. The Court concluded that this risk was not likely to occur
where a court order must be obtained for disclosure, thereby giving the defendant an op-
portunity to raise the issue of abuse. Id. at 114-15. Finally, the Court considered whether
the government would be able to subvert limitations on civil discovery rules by using dis-
closed grand jury materials. Id. at 115. The Court summarily concluded that this was “not
seriously implicated when the Government simply wishes to use the material for consul-
tation,” claiming that no per se rule had ever been established to deny disclosure even
though the materials sought could be obtained through civil discovery procedures. Id. at
115-16.
446. See supra note 417 and accompanying text. Because the scope of the civil attor-
ney’s use of grand jury materials under the Doe analysis is purely for “refamiliarization,”
however, any use which might further disclose the information must still pass the test set
forth in Sells.
447. “The crucial fact is that the use to which that attorney [who conducted the grand
jury hearing] would put this information is in no way in aid of the grand jury.” Doe, 481
U.S. at 118 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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abuse.448 Further, Doe ignored the Sells Court’s concern that
abuse, if it occurred, would be virtually impossible to show,449
particularly where the defendant may be unable to obtain the
grand jury transcripts necessary to prove abuse.450 This unfair-
ness demonstrates the reality that individuals caught in the Doe
vice cannot adequately test the merits of the government’s theory
of liability. In fact, as early as Procter & Gamble , litigants rec-
ognized that civil enforcement interests might subvert the grand
jury into a civil discovery tool.451 Moreover, in Sells, Justice Bren-
nan recognized that the exercise of the grand jury’s extraordinary
powers solely for civil investigations gave an unfair advantage to
the government as a civil plaintiff452 and left the defendant with
an extremely difficult case to defend. Consequently, Doe gave the
Department of Justice access to grand jury information through
the backdoor in a manner clearly prohibited by the Court’s prior
ruling in Sells.
Perhaps more damaging to the Sells notion of fairness in the
civil arena is the Doe Court’s conclusion that cost and delay may
be sufficient to prove “particularized need” for government ac-
cess.453 Procter & Gamble explicitly rejected this justification
when a civil defendant sought access to prepare for trial against
the government,454 while Sells rejected cost and delay as a sole
justification for government access.455 As a result of this retreat
from Sells, information that may be critical for trial preparation
can be granted to the government but denied to the defendant.
This imbalance goes directly against the purpose behind the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure456 and the concept of fundamental
fairness. At a time when civil sanctions can be as punishing, if
not more so, than some criminal penalties,457 one must question
                                                                                                             
448. See supra note 379 and accompanying text.
449. See Sells, 463 U.S. at 432.
450. This poignant problem is exemplified by the Procter & Gamble parties’ successful
proof of grand jury abuse, which took nine years and twelve published opinions before the
parties could define the issues for actual litigation. See supra notes 217-60 and accompany-
ing text.
451. Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. at 681-84.
452. See Sells, 463 U.S. at 433-34.
453. See Doe, 481 U.S. at 116.
454. Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. at 682-83.
455. See Sells, 463 U.S. at 431.
456. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947).
457. See, e.g., E.F. Hutton Mail and Wire Fraud Case, Part 1 and 2: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. of the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
The grand jury investigation of the E.F. Hutton Company’s illegal use of bank floats and
interest-free loans was settled before trial with acceptance by Hutton of a maximum fine of
$2 million, restitution of lost opportunity profits totaling approximately $264 million, and
an unprecedented reimbursal of the Justice Department’s costs of investigation. Id. at 1-2.
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whether issues of cost and delay alone should outweigh the inter-
ests in a fair trial process.
This Article’s proposed solution, the Maryland & Virginia
Milk Producers Ass’n  procedure, would take into consideration
the cost and delay to the government of duplicating grand jury
investigations for a subsequent civil action. Unlike the Doe deci-
sion, however, the procedure would require a showing by the gov-
ernment prior to disclosure that it could have obtained the mate-
rials through civil investigatory devices. Further, the defendant
would receive notice of the potential disclosure, which would en-
able him or her to challenge the disclosure and raise the issue of
grand jury abuse. This process eliminates duplication of investi-
gations to the extent that civil attorneys could have obtained the
material, while also eliminating disclosure of those materials that
the civil attorneys could not have obtained. Unlike the Doe solu-
tion, the method provides no incentive to misuse the grand jury
process because civil attorneys will gain no information they
could not have gained through their own civil investigatory de-
vices. Also, because materials sought from the grand jury become
exposed to the defendant at the disclosure hearing and prior to
filing of the civil complaint, the Maryland & Virginia Milk Pr o-
ducers Ass’n solution provides more incentive for the government
to utilize civil investigatory tools. Further, because the materials
are obtainable through civil discovery, the defendant will always
gain reciprocal access to fully prepare for trial. The solution
would eliminate the imbalance of discovery Doe and Procter &
Gamble engendered.
XII.   GRAND JURY SECRECY AFTER DOE.
Congress never passed the Reagan Administration bills that
were proposed in 1985 to overcome the “impediments” of Sells
and Baggot.458 They did not disappear, however, and surfaced
again in a new form in the Senate version of the Financial Insti-
tutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989
(FIRREA).459 Section 918 of the Senate version included language
                                                                                                             
See also United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448-49, 451 (1989) (finding that civil sanc-
tion is “punishment” for double jeopardy purposes if it is based on same offense as criminal
prosecution and is imposed in separate proceeding).
458. See supra note 417 and accompanying text.
459. FIRREA was introduced as S. 413 by Senators Donald E. Riegle and Jake Garn on
February 22, 1989. 135 CONG. REC. S1513 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1989). Representative Henry
R. Gonzales introduced the House version, H.R. 1278, on March 6, 1989. On April 13,
1989, Senator Riegle introduced S. 774 as original legislation that included the same § 918
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virtually identical to that proposed in the Grand Jury Disclosure
Amendments Act of 1985.460 When the House and Senate joined in
conference, however, they discarded section 918.461 What survived
was an amendment462 authorizing automatic disclosure of grand
jury information concerning a banking law violation to the Reso-
lution Trust Corporation attorney responsible for investigating
such violations.463 The decision to grant automatic access is now
in the discretion of the Department of Justice attorney handling
the grand jury investigation.464 Additionally, the FIRREA
amendment reduced the Rule 6(e) standard for court-ordered
disclosure of banking law violations from “particularized need” to
“substantial need” in situations where the Department of Justice
declines to grant automatic disclosure.465 This provision, which
runs afoul of Rule 6(e) as interpreted by Sells and Baggot, has not
yet been tested in the courts.466
The Bush Administration also attempted to get specific disclo-
sure for securities law violations by seeking to include a disclo-
sure provision in The Securities Law Enforcement Act of 1990.467
                                                                                                             
as S. 413 of the Federal Savings and Loan Reform Act. S. REP. NO. 19, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1989). S. 774 superseded S. 413.
460. 135 CONG. REC. S1550 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1989). Compare Disclosure Amendments
Act, supra note 414, with S. 774, 101 Cong., 1st Sess. § 918 (1989) (striking through lan-
guage proposed in the 1985 amendment and omitted in the 1989 amendment and underlin-
ing new language):
(A) Disclosure otherwise prohibited . . . may be made to—
(i) any attorney of the government for use in the performance of by an attor-
ney for of the government’s duty to enforce federal criminal or civil law; and
(ii) . . . to enforce federal criminal law.
(B) Any person . . . shall not utilize that grand jury material for any purpose
other than assisting the an attorney for the government . . .
(C) Disclosure otherwise prohibited under by this rule of matters occurring
before the grand jury may also be made—
(i) when so directed by a court, upon a showing of particularized
need,preliminary preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding.
461. H.R. REP. NO. 209, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
462. Act of Aug. 9, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 505 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3322
(1994)).
463. 18 U.S.C. § 3322(a) (1994)
464. Id.
465. Id. § 3322(b)(2). The Department of Justice might choose to decline automatic ac-
cess in cases where the criminal investigation is on-going and disclosure might interfere
with the investigation.
466. The author’s research has revealed no case law interpreting this particular
FIRREA provision, although it was enacted in 1989.
467. H.R. 975, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1990).
I am submitting a proposed revised version of H.R. 975, the “Securities Law
Enforcement Remedies Act of 1989 . . . .” [T]he proposal would amend the Fed-
eral Criminal Code to authorize a court to issue an order permitting disclosure
to the Commission of grand jury information concerning potential securities
law violations . . . just as Congress provided such authority for the banking
agencies in [FIRREA].
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The disclosure provision was made a part of the Senate version of
the bill but the House did not approve it.468 In 1994, both the
House and the Senate drafted health insurance acts that included
FIRREA-like amendments.469 At the close of 1995, a FIRREA-like
amendment to fight fraudulent Medicare practices was included
in the Medicare Preservation Act of 1995.470 Perhaps the most
subversive legislative exception to Rule 6(e) secrecy is the Inter-
national Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994
(IAEAA).471 President Clinton signed the IAEAA into law on No-
vember 2, 1994.472 This remarkable act, which represents a radi-
cal departure from the accepted practice of legislative drafting,473
penetrates the grand jury secrecy protections of Rule 6(e) by ex-
panding the definition of a “state” under 6(e)(3(C)(iv)474 to include
foreign countries, and by defining a “state criminal law” as “a
foreign antitrust law” and “an appropriate official” as “a foreign
antitrust authority.”475 Given the proliferation of legislation
                                                                                                             
H.R. REP. NO. 616, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 39 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379,
1406 (quoting Letter from Daniel L. Goelzer, Office of the General Counsel of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, to Rep. John D. Dingell (Feb. 9, 1990)). H.R. 975 which
was ultimately incorporated into H.R. 5325.
468. 136 CONG. REC. S14069 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1990) (statement of Sen. Riegle).
469. H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (Health Security Act); S. 2357, 103d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1994) (Universal Health Insurance Coverage Act); S. 2296, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1994) (Individual and Family Health Security Act).
470. H.R. 2425, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); see also H.R. REP. NO. 276, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1995).
471. Pub. L. No. 103-438, 108 Stat. 4597 (1994) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6204 (1994)).
472. H.R. REP. NO. 883, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 130 (1995).
473. “[Y]ou shouldn’t define a word in a sense significantly different from the way it is
normally understood by the persons to whom the legislation is primarily addressed. This is
a fundamental principle of communication and it is one of the shames of the legal profes-
sion that draftsmen so flagrantly violate it.” Reed Dickerson, How to Write a Law, 31
NOTRE DAME LAW. 14, 25 (1955)).
474. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6 states in pertinent part:
Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before the
grand jury may also be made—
. . .
(iv) when permitted by a court at the request of an attorney for the govern-
ment, upon a showing that such matters may disclose a violation of state
criminal law, to an appropriate official of a state or subdivision of a state for
the purpose of enforcing such law.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(iv).
475. 15 U.S.C. § 6204(2)(A)-(B) (1994):
(2) Antitrust evidence that is matter occurring before a grand jury and with
respect to which disclosure is prevented by Federal law, except that for the
purpose of applying Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(iv) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure with respect to this section—
(A) a foreign antitrust authority with respect to which a particularized need
for such antitrust evidence is shown shall be considered to be an appropriate
official of any of the several States, and
(B) a foreign antitrust law administered or enforced by the foreign antitrust
authority shall be considered to be a State criminal law.
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granting specific rights of automatic disclosure for federal agen-
cies’ civil use, it seems clear that such legislation is also circum-
venting the “impediments” and teachings of Baggot.
In his recent article, Professor Graham Hughes questioned
whether FIRREA might be the “crack that will eventually cause
the collapse of the whole dam” in grand jury secrecy.476 In light of
the recent legislation incorporating disclosure clauses, the an-
swer, unfortunately, appears to be yes. While the legislative pro-
visions have not been constitutionally tested, efforts to enact
greater executive branch use of the grand jury process for civil
purposes apparently will continue,477 although not all of them
have met with success.478 The movement toward the erosion of
Rule 6(e) hopefully will yield to a more reasoned analysis along
the lines of the proposal in Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers
Ass’n, which would preserve to the greatest extent possible the
historical importance of grand jury secrecy.
XIII.   THE MARYLAND & VIRGINIA MILK PRODUCERS ASS’N
SOLUTION
This Article envisions the use in parallel criminal and civil
regulatory investigations of a process that would eliminate the
all-or-nothing approach of prior court decisions. This process
reaches a compromise between the competing interests of gov-
ernment efficiency and the need to protect individuals from an
overreaching executive branch.
If the Procter & Gamble  Court had applied the Maryland &
Virginia Milk Producers Ass’n  procedure, it would have elimi-
nated nine years of litigation. Government prosecutors would
have been required to notify Procter & Gamble of their intent to
disclose grand jury materials to civil attorneys. Having notice,479
Procter & Gamble would then have had the opportunity to chal-
lenge the disclosure at a hearing, where prosecutors would have
borne the burden of proving to the court that all information to be
disclosed would be discoverable to the government civil attorneys
                                                                                                             
476. Hughes, supra note 16, at 656 (advocating unification of federal criminal and civil
compulsory processes).
477. The Balanced Budget Act of 1995 included House and Senate provisions for dis-
closure of health care offenses discovered during grand jury proceedings, but both provi-
sions were dropped in conference. H.R. REP. NO. 350, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
478. See supra text accompanying notes 467-68.
479. “Notice and opportunity to be heard are indispensable to a fair trial whether the
case be criminal or civil.” Joint Anti-Fascist Refuge Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 178
(1951) (Douglas, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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through civil investigative devices. At this hearing, Procter &
Gamble would have been given the opportunity to challenge that
proof, just as they would have if the government had used civil
investigatory devices. All materials the court deemed subject to
disclosure at the hearing would likewise have been discoverable
to Procter & Gamble under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
once the complaint was filed.480 Materials the court found were
not subject to disclosure at the hearing could not have been used
in the subsequent civil proceeding.481 Any information the gov-
ernment gained without the aid of the grand jury would not have
been exposed prior to filing of the complaint.482 This process
would save the cost of duplicate investigations while eliminating
the temptation to use the grand jury process as a civil discovery
device483 and would maintain the balance of civil discovery.
 Further, the D.C. Circuit’s solution would result in a more ex-
peditious determination of civil actions. If both parties knew from
the case’s inception that evidence is nondiscoverable through ei-
ther grand jury access or civil investigatory devices, they would
be able to gauge the probable trial outcome. Thus, this process
would achieve the goals of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and further law enforcement objectives without sacrificing the in-
tegrity of the grand jury system.
XIV.   CONCLUSION
“The history of American freedom is, in no small measure, the
history of procedure.”484 The Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth
Amendment protects individuals against oppression by the gov-
ernment. The procedural rule governing grand jury secrecy is a
substantial part of that protection, yet it has been the subject of
extensive litigation where parallel civil and criminal government
investigations threaten to compromise that secrecy. When the
                                                                                                             
480. FED. R. CIV. P. 26.
481. Such materials, generally speaking, would include information gained through
grants of immunity or derived through illegal search and seizures.
482. United States v. Markwood, 48 F.3d 969, 984 (6th Cir. 1995).
483. We think the concern [of grand jury abuse] is far less worrisome when the
attorneys seeking disclosure [of grand jury material for civil use] must go be-
fore a court and demonstrate a particularized need prior to any disclosure, and
when, as part of that inquiry, the district court may properly consider whether
the circumstances disclose any evidence of grand jury abuse.
United States v. John Doe, Inc., 481 U.S. 102, 114-15 (1987). It would, inherently, also be
far less worrisome if the government attorneys knew that the only information they could
obtain from the grand jury could be gained through civil channels anyway and that their
conduct would be open to scrutiny in a disclosure hearing.
484. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945).
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government seeks to penetrate secrecy to aid civil regulatory ac-
tions, courts should balance the interests advanced by the parties
against the standard of fairness implicit in constitutional due
process. Courts must balance consideration of the costs and delay
in compelling the government to duplicate grand jury investiga-
tions in parallel or subsequent civil actions against the civil de-
fendant’s concern for the secrecy of grand jury proceedings. Use
of the grand jury’s extraordinary powers will give prosecutors in-
credible pretrial and trial advantages over future civil targets,
especially where those powers are otherwise unavailable through
authorized civil discovery tools.
While cost-effective civil law enforcement is a crucial issue in
this era of alarming governmental deficits, coalescing the civil
and criminal processes in the manner recommended by Professor
Hughes is not the most equitable alternative in terms of fair
process to the individual. Our justice system has survived on
principles that preserve individual civil liberties and due process.
From the perspective of those who founded a country by revolu-
tion against an overreaching and tyrannical government, arguing
for efficiency at the cost of fair process is equivalent to advocating
a return to the monarchy.485
Application of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) must
balance the need for enforcing laws against the necessity of safe-
guarding fundamental rights. Maryland & Virginia Milk Produ c-
ers Ass’n presented a common-sense solution to the issue of grand
jury secrecy in the environment of parallel proceedings. On this
fiftieth anniversary of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the Supreme Court and Congress should revisit the issue and
decisively establish this equitable principle as an amendment to
Rule 6(e). The following would modify Rule 6(e)(C)(i) in an appro-
priate manner:
(C) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters oc-
curring before the grand jury may also be made—
(i) when so directed by a court preliminary to or in connection
with a judicial proceeding upon the following showing:
                                                                                                             
485. “Of course, efficiency and promptness can never be substituted for due process
and adherence to the Constitution. Is not a dictatorship the most ‘efficient’ form of gov-
ernment?” United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 842 n.13 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See also O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 356 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting):
The Constitution was not adopted as a means of enhancing the efficiency
with which government officials conduct their affairs, nor as a blueprint for en-
suring sufficient reliance on administrative expertise. Rather, it was meant to
provide a bulwark against infringements that might otherwise be justified as
necessary expedients of governing.
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(a) In civil regulatory proceedings involving the govern-
ment, the government must prove grand jury matters
sought to be used by the government in the civil proceeding
would be obtainable through civil investigatory devices.
Where the government obtains disclosure under such
showing, the private opponent may discover these grand
jury materials under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
(b) Where the government seeks disclosure of grand jury
materials for use in a civil proceeding pursuant to subsec-
tion (a), notice must be given to the opponent and an adver-
sarial hearing open only to the prosecutor and potential
civil defendant and counsel must be conducted prior to dis-
closure.
(c) In civil proceedings involving private parties, compelling
particularized need for grand jury matter must be shown al-
though the material may be discoverable under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
(d) Disclosure determinations for private litigants pursuant
to subsection (c) may be ex parte.
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APPENDIX
 “ORDER”486
During the grand jury proceedings which preceded these
criminal cases, the United States obtained and copied thousands
of documents from the files of the Maryland and Virginia Milk
Producers Association. After the cases had terminated favorably
to the Association, the Government returned to it the original
documents but refused to return the copies, claiming them as its
own property and saying it will or possibly may rely upon some of
them in the trial of a civil action now pending in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia.
The Association moved the District Court to require the return
of the copies. The motion was denied, the trial judge holding that,
as the documents could be reached by the Government through
discovery process in the civil action, it would be vain to order the
copies delivered to the Association. This appeal is from the denial
of the motion.
We hold the United States may retain the copies of the docu-
ments in question, subject to the following limitations:
1. That it may use in the trial of the pending civil action only
such of the documents, of which it has retained copies, as it could
obtain through discovery processes applicable to civil actions, and
only such as are enumerated by it as those upon which it will or
possibly may rely, in a list to be served upon the Association on or
before March 1, 1958, and in no event less than 60 days prior to
the commencement of such trial;
2. That the United States may use in the trial of any future
civil action against the Association only such of the documents, of
which it has retained copies, as it could obtain through discovery
processes available to civil actions and only such as are enumer-
ated by it as those upon which it will or possibly may rely, in a
list to served upon the Association not less than 60 days prior to
the commencement of the trial of any such future civil action;
3. That in the lists the documents intended to be relied upon
shall be described and referred to by the identification numbers
placed thereon by the Association at the time of their submission.
The order appealed from should be modified to include the
foregoing provisions.
                                                                                                             
486. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers’ Ass’n v. United States, 250 F.2d 425, 425-26
(D.C. Cir. 1957) (citations omitted).
